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NOTES 
O SONIA, WHERE ART THOU?:  WHY JUSTICE 
SOTOMAYOR’S SILENT “OPINION” SHOULD 
SERVE AS SHADY GROVE’S HOLDING 
Craig T. Cagney*
 
 
Since the Supreme Court decided the case in 1938, Erie Railroad Co. v. 
Tompkins has limited the application of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure.  By changing shape, Erie has eluded the Court’s attempts to 
curb its influence for most of the past century.  Only recently, in Shady 
Grove Orthopedic Associates, P.A. v. Allstate Insurance Co., did the Court 
manage to apply a Federal Rule over Erie’s contrary command to apply 
state law, but that decision so divided the Court that no one opinion 
enjoyed the support of five Justices.  The resulting confusion among the 
lower courts over which should serve as Shady Grove’s holding has 
allowed Erie to escape again in a new form.  This Note argues that these 
courts have overlooked Justice Sotomayor’s hidden “opinion,” which 
decided Shady Grove on the narrowest grounds and would have avoided 
their conflicting decisions. 
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INTRODUCTION 
“But all the while the myth of Erie was abuilding, and with it the belief 
that it carried some special constitutional magic of a sort that transcended 
ordinary issues of federal power.”1
Erie is the trickster of federal civil procedure.  In mythology and 
folktales, the trickster character is a shape-shifting entity that bends and 
breaks conventional rules to beguile his victims and avoid capture.
 
2  The 
nebulous decision in Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins3 has similarly 
confounded the federal courts.  It has left them uncertain as to when they 
may apply their own procedural rules, and has convinced them at times to 
displace—and even distort—these rules.  Meanwhile, Erie has eluded the 
U.S. Supreme Court’s attempts to pin down its meaning and remove this 
uncertainty.  Each time, Erie furtively returns in a new form to baffle and 
mislead the courts.4  The Supreme Court’s recent decision in Shady Grove 
Orthopedic Associates, P.A. v. Allstate Insurance Co.,5
This epic struggle began nearly a century ago.  Pursuant to the authority 
granted in the Rules Enabling Act
 which should have 
eliminated Erie’s influence once and for all, is only the most recent episode 
of futility in this continuing odyssey. 
6 (Enabling Act), eight Supreme Court 
Justices approved the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (Federal Rules) as a 
uniform replacement for the idiosyncratic state procedural rules that the 
federal courts had previously used.7
 
 1. John Hart Ely, The Irrepressible Myth of Erie, 87 HARV. L. REV. 693, 704–05 
(1974). 
  Soon after these rules were sent to 
 2. See STITH THOMPSON, THE FOLKTALE 319–28 (1946).  For example, in one folktale 
from a Native American tribe, the trickster Wemicus attempted to kill his son-in-law, but the 
son-in-law turned those murderous plans against him. Id. at 333.  Wemicus avoided his own 
death by turning into a pike. Id. 
 3. 304 U.S. 64 (1938); see Henry P. Chandler, Some Major Advances in the Federal 
Judicial System 1922–1947, 31 F.R.D. 307, 503–04 (1963). 
 4. See infra notes 173–83 and accompanying text. 
 5. 130 S. Ct. 1431 (2010). 
 6. Ch. 651, 48 Stat. 1064 (1934) (current version at 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (2006)). 
 7. See Order of Dec. 20, 1937, 302 U.S. 783 (1937); Chandler, supra note 3, at 503. 
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Congress for review, the lone dissenting Justice penned the decision in 
Erie,8 which would forever thwart their effectiveness.9  Erie held that 
federal courts must apply certain state laws in cases invoking their diversity 
jurisdiction.10  The decision, however, neither identified which state laws 
must apply, nor clarified whether those laws must also supersede any 
conflicting Federal Rules.11  Because of this ambiguity, hesitant courts only 
applied a Federal Rule in diversity cases after engaging in a “relatively 
unguided” Erie analysis12 to determine if they were allowed to do so.13
In the ensuing years, the Supreme Court failed to reach a consensus on 
what Erie meant and whether its command superseded Congress’s 
authorization of a uniform system of federal procedure.
 
14  When the Court 
finally did direct federal courts to apply any Federal Rule that directly 
conflicted with a contrary state law, it later eviscerated that command by 
construing the Rules narrowly to avoid any such conflict.15  The reasoning 
changed to reflect the Court’s various machinations and contortions, but the 
end result remained the same:  Erie’s influence survived and federal courts 
only applied the Federal Rules when Erie allowed them to do so.16
In what should have been the climactic end to this epic, the Shady Grove 
Court finally applied a Federal Rule despite Erie’s contrary command.
 
17
 
 8. Erie, 304 U.S. at 69; see Chandler, supra note 
  
As in every previous episode, however, Erie has changed shape and 
survived.  The Supreme Court could only produce an enigmatic decision 
that left it unclear how a federal court could ever again apply a Federal Rule 
3, at 503–04 (“Mr. Justice Brandeis 
never put in writing his reasons for dissenting . . . .  It seems probable that they were related 
to the philosophy of his decision rendered within a few months in April 1938 in Erie 
Railroad v. Tompkins.”). 
 9. See Earl C. Dudley, Jr. & George Rutherglen, Deforming the Federal Rules:  An 
Essay on What’s Wrong with the Recent Erie Decisions, 92 VA. L. REV. 707, 728–30 (2006) 
(explaining how Erie and the Court’s early interpretations of its requirements “combined to 
threaten the integrity of the Federal Rules”); id. at 737 (noting that “conflicts between the 
Federal Rules and state law . . . [remain] the principal arena in which controversies persist 
under the Erie doctrine”). 
 10. See infra notes 47–56 and accompanying text.  The federal courts’ diversity 
jurisdiction is invoked when there is complete diversity of citizenship—that is, no plaintiff is 
from the same state as any defendant—and the dispute involves more than $75,000. See 28 
U.S.C. § 1332(a) (2006); Strawbridge v. Curtiss, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 267, 267 (1806) 
(interpreting the predecessor to § 1332(a) as requiring complete diversity of citizenship).  It 
is usually necessary to invoke the court’s diversity jurisdiction to bring a claim created by 
state law, because the federal courts have separate authority to exercise subject matter 
jurisdiction over federal questions. See 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2006). 
 11. See generally Dudley & Rutherglen, supra note 9 (discussing the influence of Erie 
on pre-Shady Grove decisions); infra notes 58–64 and accompanying text. 
 12. Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 471 (1965). 
 13. See, e.g., Sampson v. Channell, 110 F.2d 754, 756–57 (1st Cir. 1940) (reasoning that 
classifications of substance and procedure must be reevaluated in light of Erie); Francis v. 
Humphrey, 25 F. Supp. 1, 2–4 (E.D. Ill. 1938) (reasoning that Erie restricts the Federal 
Rules’ scope); Summers v. Hearst, 23 F. Supp. 986, 992 (S.D.N.Y. 1938) (deciding that Erie 
could have no effect on the application of an equity rule, a predecessor to the Federal Rules). 
 14. See generally infra Part I. 
 15. See infra notes 106–29, 155–57 and accompanying text. 
 16. See infra notes 173–91 and accompanying text. 
 17. See infra notes 193, 203 and accompanying text. 
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against Erie’s wishes.  A four-Justice plurality and a single concurring 
Justice formed a tentative majority, but proposed two competing Erie-free 
analyses for determining whether a federal court must apply a Federal Rule 
or a conflicting state law.18  The plurality divided even further when Justice 
Sonia Sotomayor abandoned a portion of Justice Antonin Scalia’s 
opinion.19
Shady Grove’s labyrinthine decision has produced a new split among the 
lower courts over whether Justice Scalia’s plurality opinion or Justice John 
Paul Stevens’s concurring opinion should serve as the effective holding.
 
20  
Many side with Justice Stevens in continued obeisance to Erie’s decree.21  
If one carefully considers Justice Sotomayor’s departure from the plurality, 
however, a hidden third “opinion” emerges from those parts that she 
joined.22
This Note consists of four parts.  Part I briefly examines the Court’s Erie 
and Federal Rules jurisprudence to determine the prevailing precedent 
before Shady Grove.  Part II presents Justices Scalia’s and Stevens’s 
positions in Shady Grove and analyzes each to determine whether it could 
serve as the Court’s holding under the Marks v. United States
  This Note argues that this “opinion” actually decided the case on 
the narrowest grounds, and should serve as the basis for a clearer Federal 
Rules analysis that protects their uniformity from Erie’s disruptive 
influence. 
23
I.  THE SUPREME COURT’S ERIE ODYSSEY 
 doctrine.  
Part III examines the lower court decisions that have followed both Justices 
Scalia’s and Stevens’s tests in factual contexts similar to those in Shady 
Grove.  Part IV argues that Justice Sotomayor’s decision not to join part of 
the plurality opinion created a third approach, which would have avoided 
these lower courts’ conflicting decisions and should be followed as Shady 
Grove’s effective holding in the future. 
This part examines how the Federal Rules became entangled with the 
Erie doctrine and discerns which decisions served as the governing 
precedent before Shady Grove.  Part I.A begins by analyzing Erie, which 
effectively held that federal courts must apply state substantive law in 
diversity cases, but mysteriously ignored that holding’s implications for the 
 
 18. See infra Part II. 
 19. See infra note 227 and accompanying text; see also infra Part IV. 
 20. See infra Part III. 
 21. See infra Part III.C; see also infra notes 369–71 and accompanying text. 
 22. This Note refers to Parts II.A, B, and D of Justice Scalia’s opinion as Justice 
Sotomayor’s “opinion” because she was the only member of the plurality who joined only 
these parts. See Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 130 S. Ct. 1431, 
1436 (2010).  Although Chief Justice John Roberts and Justices Scalia and Clarence Thomas 
also joined Parts II.A, B, and D, see id., this Note argues that joining Part II.C indicates that 
they share a broader understanding of the Enabling Act’s authorization, see infra Part IV.  
Reading Parts II.A, B, and D in isolation, as Justice Sotomayor would have, reveals a 
narrower understanding. See id. 
 23. 430 U.S. 188 (1977).  The Marks doctrine helps lower courts determine the Court’s 
effective holding “[w]hen a fragmented Court decides a case and no single rationale 
explaining the result enjoys the assent of five Justices.” Id. at 193. 
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pending Federal Rules.24  This part then surveys the Court’s episodic 
attempts to eliminate Erie’s disruptive influence over the Federal Rules.  
Part I.B examines the decisions before Hanna v. Plumer,25 in which the 
Court only applied a Federal Rule if Erie did not require the state law to 
apply.26  Part I.C describes Hanna’s attempt to abrogate that rule by 
insisting that the Enabling Act, and not Erie, governed the validity of the 
Federal Rules.27  Part I.D explains how Erie transformed into a “sensitivity 
to important state interests,”28 which convinced the Court to interpret the 
Rules narrowly when Erie required state law to apply.29
A.  Erie Is Born 
 
Erie’s first trick was its own birth.  That decision unpredictably inverted 
the federal courts’ previous practice of applying federal substantive law and 
state procedural rules.30  The distinction between substantive and 
procedural law was the product of two laws originally passed in 1789:  the 
Conformity Act31 and the Rules of Decision Act.32  Under both the original 
Conformity Act, which required “static conformity” with the rules as they 
existed in 1789, and its more flexible successors, each federal court had to 
utilize the procedural rules of the state in which it sat.33  The Rules of 
Decision Act similarly commanded that “the laws of the several states, 
except where [federal law] shall otherwise require or provide, shall be 
regarded as rules of decision in trials at common law in the courts of the 
United States.”34  The Supreme Court in Swift v. Tyson,35 however, 
construed “the laws of the several states” to mean only state statutes and 
laws affecting uniquely local matters, but not substantive areas of the 
common law, like contracts and torts.36
 
 24. See infra notes 
  The Court held that the federal 
58–64 and accompanying text. 
 25. 380 U.S. 460 (1965). 
 26. See infra notes 95, 98–99 and accompanying text. 
 27. See infra notes 106–08 and accompanying text. 
 28. Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415, 427 n.7 (1996); see infra notes 
119–30, 154–62, 167–72 and accompanying text. 
 29. See infra notes 173–91 and accompanying text. 
 30. See Stephen B. Burbank, The Rules Enabling Act of 1934, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1015, 
1036 (1982); Dudley & Rutherglen, supra note 9, at 719. 
 31. Process (Conformity) Act of 1789, ch. 21, 1 Stat. 93 (repealed 1828). 
 32. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 34, 1 Stat. 73, 92 (1789) (current version at 28 
U.S.C. § 1652 (2006)). 
 33. 4 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE 
§ 1002, at 11 (3d ed. 2002 & Supp. 2011); Burbank, supra note 30, at 1037; see also 
Conformity Act of 1872, ch. 255, § 5, 17 Stat. 196 (superseded by Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure 1938 and repealed 1948) (allowing conformity, “as near as may be,” with the 
current state procedural laws); Conformity Act of 1842, ch. 109, 5 Stat. 499 (superseded 
1872) (extending 1828 Act to include states admitted after 1828); Conformity Act of 1828, 
ch. 68, § 1, 4 Stat. 278 (superseded 1842) (allowing federal courts to conform with 
procedure used by states in 1828). 
 34. Ch. 20, § 34, 1 Stat. at 92. 
 35. 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842). 
 36. See id. at 18; 17A JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE 
§ 124.01[1], at 124-8 (3d ed. 2011). 
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courts could determine the substantive common law for themselves.37  
Thus, under the Conformity Acts and Swift’s interpretation of the Rules of 
Decision Act, the federal courts applied federal substantive common law 
and state procedural rules in diversity actions.38
This scheme began to change in 1934.
 
39  Even under the more flexible 
Conformity Act of 1872,40 federal courts “continued to operate in an 
atmosphere of uncertainty and confusion” when determining each state’s 
procedural rules.41  Reformers pushed for a uniform, national set of rules 
for all federal courts.42  In response to this reform movement, Congress 
passed the Enabling Act43 in 1934, which authorized the Supreme Court “to 
prescribe, by general rules . . . the practice and procedure in civil actions at 
law,” but included the crucial limitation that “[s]aid rules shall neither 
abridge, enlarge, nor modify the substantive rights of any litigant.”44  
Pursuant to the Enabling Act’s authorization, the Supreme Court 
commissioned an Advisory Committee to draft the new procedural rules in 
1935 and adopted the final draft in December 1937.45
 
 37. Swift, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) at 18; see 17A MOORE, supra note 
  Because the 
36, § 124.01[1], at 124-8.  
For example, in the negligence action in Erie, both of the lower federal courts decided the 
proper duty of care for themselves and did not consider Pennsylvania’s negligence law. See 
Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 70 (1938). 
 38. See Dudley & Rutherglen, supra note 9, at 719; Stephen N. Subrin, How Equity 
Conquered Common Law:  The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in Historical Perspective, 
135 U. PA. L. REV. 909, 930 & n.115 (1987). 
 39. See Rules Enabling Act, ch. 651, 48 Stat. 1064 (1934) (current version at 28 U.S.C. 
§ 2072 (2006)) (authorizing the Supreme Court to promulgate federal rules of procedure). 
 40. Ch. 255, § 5, 17 Stat. 197 (superseded by Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 1938 and 
repealed 1948); see 4 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 33, § 1002, at 15–16.  In addition to 
allowing conformity to current state procedural rules, the 1872 Act also allowed federal 
courts to conform “‘as near as may be’” to state practices, which the courts used to develop 
their own procedural rules for the state. Id. § 1002, at 16 (quoting Conformity Act of 1872, 
ch. 255, § 5). 
 41. 4 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 33, § 1002, at 16. 
 42. Id.; Burbank, supra note 30, at 1035–36, 1040–42; Subrin, supra note 38, at 943–44. 
 43. Ch. 651, 48 Stat. 1064. 
 44. Id. § 1; see 4 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 33, § 1003, at 22 n.11; Burbank, supra 
note 30, at 1095–97.  According to Professor Stephen Burbank, the drafters of the Enabling 
Act did not intend for the “substantive right” restriction to protect state interests. See id. at 
1112.  After all, the Enabling Act was passed while the courts still applied federal 
substantive law. See id. at 1109.  The drafters only intended for it to “emphasize a restriction 
inherent in the use of the word ‘procedure’ in the first sentence” and not to “perform any 
additional function.” Id. at 1108.  Professor Burbank argued that the provision only served to 
clarify the “allocat[ion] [of] lawmaking power between the Supreme Court as rulemaker and 
Congress,” id. at 1106, to prevent the Court from using its rulemaking power to create 
substantive law, id. at 1124–25; cf. Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1, 10 (1941) 
(characterizing the Enabling Act’s limitation as preventing the Court from altering 
substantive rights “in the guise of regulating procedure”); Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 
U.S. 64, 78 (1938) (reasoning that the Constitution does not grant to either Congress or the 
federal courts the “power to declare substantive rules of common law applicable in a State”). 
 45. See 4 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 33, § 1004, at 25–29; Chandler, supra note 3, at 
491–98.  The long delay was based in part on disagreements on the form of certain rules, 
such as whether a lawsuit should commence with the filing of a complaint or upon service of 
process. Chandler, supra note 3, at 496–97.  The Committee eventually decided that the 
filing of a complaint should commence a lawsuit based on the majority preference of the 
committee members. Id. at 497; cf. FED. R. CIV. P. 3 (“A civil action is commenced by filing 
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proposed Federal Rules would apply to actions in both law and equity, they 
had to be sent to Congress for review before they became effective.46
While the Federal Rules were under review, the Supreme Court heard the 
landmark case of Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins.
 
47  Even though neither 
party had argued for the Court to overrule Swift, it did just that and 
unpredictably abandoned that nearly century-old interpretation of the Rules 
of Decision Act.48  Harry Tompkins had filed a negligence action in the 
U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York against the Erie 
Railroad, after one of its train doors hit him and severed his arm in 
Pennsylvania.49  Tompkins could recover damages against the railroad only 
if it had owed him a duty of care.50  Both the district court and the Second 
Circuit had held that federal common law imposed a duty on the railroad 
and awarded damages to Tompkins.51  The Supreme Court surprisingly 
reversed, holding that “[t]here [was] no federal general common law.”52
Overruling Swift, the Court decided that the “law of the several states” in 
the Rules of Decision Act referred to both state statutes and state common 
law.
 
53  Swift, the Court reasoned, had intended to promote a uniform 
national common law, but in doing so assumed a power to decree a 
substantive common law that the Constitution did not grant.54  Furthermore, 
states had persisted in interpreting the common law for themselves and the 
resulting discrepancies between state and federal common law afforded 
diverse litigants an unfair choice that did not exist for litigants who could 
not invoke the federal courts’ diversity jurisdiction.55
 
a complaint with the court.”).  The Committee noted, however, that the Enabling Act may 
not authorize the Federal Rules to toll a state’s statute of limitations upon the filing of a 
complaint. See Burbank, supra note 
  To prevent this 
disparity, the Court reasoned that federal courts must apply state law where 
30, at 1158; cf. infra notes 90–95, 121–29 (discussing 
the Court’s decisions on whether Federal Rule 3 tolls a state’s statute of limitations). 
 46. Chandler, supra note 3, at 491, 505. 
 47. 304 U.S. 64 (1938). 
 48. See Allan Ides, The Supreme Court and the Law to Be Applied in Diversity Cases:  A 
Critical Guide to the Development and Application of the Erie Doctrine and Related 
Problems, 163 F.R.D. 19, 24–25 (1995). 
 49. Erie, 304 U.S. at 69; see Ides, supra note 48, at 19. 
 50. Erie, 304 U.S. at 69. 
 51. Id. at 70. 
 52. Id. at 78; see 17A MOORE, supra note 36, § 124.01[1], at 124-9. 
 53. Erie, 304 U.S. at 78; see 17A MOORE, supra note 36, § 124.01[1], at 124-9. 
 54. Erie, 304 U.S. at 74–75, 78–80; see 17A MOORE, supra note 36, § 124.01[1], at 
124-9; Ides, supra note 48, at 26.  Justice Brandeis suggested that the new interpretation of 
the Rules of Decision Act was constitutionally mandated, but most commentators regard this 
reasoning as a non-binding dictum because reinterpreting that statute was sufficient to decide 
the case. See 17A MOORE, supra note 36, § 124.01[01], at 124-9 & n.7; Charles E. Clark, 
State Law in the Federal Courts:  The Brooding Omnipresence of Erie v. Tompkins, 55 
YALE L.J. 267, 278 (1946); Ely, supra note 1, at 702–04.  Still, Brandeis’s language 
suggested that Erie was a constitutional definition of the boundary between federal and state 
authority and might explain why courts have applied that doctrine to the Federal Rules. See, 
e.g., Francis v. Humphrey, 25 F. Supp. 1, 4 (E.D. Ill. 1938) (reasoning that a Federal Rule 
that would affect state substantive rights “is beyond the constitutional power of both the 
federal courts and of Congress” (citing Erie, 304 U.S. at 78)); Ely, supra note 1, at 704–06. 
 55. Erie, 304 U.S. at 74–75; see 17A MOORE, supra note 36, § 124.01[1], at 124-9 to 
-10; Ides, supra note 48, at 26. 
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neither the Constitution nor a federal statute governed the issues before 
them.56
The decision did not qualify this broad command.
 
57  Justice Louis 
Brandeis, Erie’s author and the lone dissenter to the Federal Rules’ 
adoption,58 did not expressly preserve federal authority over procedure, nor 
did he mention the new, pending Federal Rules.59  Only Justice Stanley 
Forman Reed, in a concurring opinion, argued that “[t]he line between 
procedural and substantive law is hazy but no one doubts federal power 
over procedure.”60  Perhaps because it reversed Swift,61 or possibly because 
earlier decisions had ruled that the Rules of Decision Act did not govern 
procedural law,62 Erie was commonly and quickly understood only to 
require the application of state substantive law.63  With only conventional 
wisdom defining the scope of its authority, Erie posed an immediate threat 
to the Federal Rules, which had no authority under the Enabling Act to 
affect substantive rights.64
B.  Erie Lords over the Federal Rules 
 
The first challenge to the Rules reached the Supreme Court in 1941 in 
Sibbach v. Wilson & Co.65  In response to Hertha Sibbach’s personal injury 
suit, Wilson had moved for a court order requiring a physical examination 
of her injuries, pursuant to Federal Rule 35.66  Because Illinois law 
prohibited such mandatory exams,67 Sibbach refused to comply with the 
court’s order.68  She claimed that Rule 35 abridged her substantive right to 
be free from such exams, in violation of the Enabling Act,69 and that Erie 
required the court to apply Illinois law.70
 
 56. Erie, 304 U.S. at 77–78; see 17A MOORE, supra note 
  Adopting the popular 
36, § 124.01[1], at 124-9. 
 57. See 17A MOORE, supra note 36, § 124.01[1], at 124-10. 
 58. See Order of Dec. 20, 1937, 302 U.S. 783 (1937) (noting Justice Brandeis’s dissent); 
Chandler, supra note 3, at 503–04. 
 59. See 17A MOORE, supra note 36, § 124.01[1], at 124-10; Ely, supra note 1, at 708 & 
n.80. 
 60. Erie, 304 U.S. at 92 (Reed, J., concurring). 
 61. See, e.g., Francis v. Humphrey, 25 F. Supp. 1, 2–4 (E.D. Ill. 1938) (explaining that 
Erie had inverted the Swift scheme and, “legally speaking, ‘turned the world upside down’”). 
 62. See Wayman v. Southard, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 1, 26 (1825) (holding that the Rules 
of Decision Act “has no application to the practice of the Court”); Brief for Respondent at 
12–15, Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1 (1941) (No. 28), 1910 WL 21010, at *12–15 
(citing Wayman and asserting that Erie governed only substantive law because it only 
interpreted the Rules of Decision Act). 
 63. See Erie, 304 U.S. at 92 (Reed, J., concurring); 17A MOORE, supra note 36, 
§ 124.01[1], at 124-10; Clark, supra note 54, at 288; Charles E. Clark, The Tompkins Case 
and the Federal Rules, 1 F.R.D. 417, 417–18 (1940). 
 64. See generally Clark, supra note 63 (discussing concerns about Erie’s potential 
impact on the Federal Rules immediately after that case was decided). 
 65. 312 U.S. 1, 4 (1941); see Ides, supra note 48, at 29. 
 66. Sibbach, 312 U.S. at 4 (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 35). 
 67. Id. at 7. 
 68. Id. at 10–11. 
 69. Id. 
 70. See Supplemental Brief of Petitioner at 9–10, Sibbach, 312 U.S. 1 (No. 28), 1910 
WL 21009, at *9–10.  Although the Court did not reference Erie in its decision, both parties 
2011] O SONIA, WHERE ART THOU? 197 
understanding that Erie established a federal procedural–state substantive 
law scheme,71 the Supreme Court reasoned that Rule 35 was valid because 
it “really regulate[d] procedure,—the judicial process for enforcing rights 
and duties recognized by substantive law.”72  The Enabling Act’s limitation 
on affecting substantive rights, according to the Court, meant only that the 
Federal Rules must not regulate those rights “in the guise of regulating 
procedure.”73  It rejected Sibbach’s contention that the term “substantive 
rights” included “important” or “substantial” rights created by state 
procedural rules.74  According to the Court, Sibbach’s “asserted right . . . 
[was] no more important than many others enjoyed by litigants . . . before 
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure altered and abolished old rights or 
privileges and created new ones in connection with the conduct of 
litigation.”75  Because Sibbach had conceded that Rule 35 regulated 
procedure,76 the Supreme Court affirmed its validity under the Enabling 
Act.77
Although Sibbach tried to confine Erie’s scope to those laws regulating 
substance, it provided little guidance on how to determine which laws 
regulated substance and which procedure.  This led to the predictable 
conundrum presented in Guaranty Trust Co. v. York,
 
78 in which the Court 
had to decide whether Erie required federal courts to apply a state statute of 
limitations that New York courts had described as both substantive and 
procedural.79  Disregarding the state’s characterizations of the statute 
because they were made in different contexts,80
 
had cited the case in their briefs as requiring the application of state substantive law, but not 
federal procedural law. See id.; Brief of Respondent at 12–15, Sibbach, 312 U.S. 1 (No. 28), 
1910 WL 21010, at *12–15. 
 the Court reasoned that a 
law must be substantive “in the aspect that alone is relevant to [the Erie] 
problem”:  whether “it significantly affect[ed] the result of a litigation” such 
that “the outcome of the litigation in the federal court [would] be 
 71. Sibbach, 312 U.S. at 10 & n.8 (citing Rules of Decision Act, Judiciary Act of 1789, 
ch. 20, § 34, 1 Stat. 73, 92); see Burbank, supra note 30, at 1029; Ides, supra note 48, at 31. 
 72. Sibbach, 312 U.S. at 14. 
 73. Id. at 10; see Ely, supra note 1, at 719; Ides, supra note 48, at 30–31; cf. supra note 
44 (discussing original intent of Enabling Act’s drafters). 
 74. Sibbach, 312 U.S. at 11; see Burbank, supra note 30, at 1030. 
 75. Sibbach, 312 U.S. at 14. 
 76. Sibbach was forced to argue that the issue regulated by Rule 35 was at least partially 
procedural.  If Sibbach had convinced the Court that the matter was purely substantive, the 
district court would have applied Indiana law under traditional choice-of-law rules because 
the accident occurred in that state. See Sibbach, 312 U.S. at 10–11.  Indiana, however, 
permitted court-ordered examinations. See id. at 7.  To ensure the federal court would apply 
Illinois law, which prohibited such exams, Sibbach argued that the issue was substantive for 
Erie purposes, but was procedural “[o]n the question of whether the Indiana or Illinois law 
govern[ed].” See Supplemental Brief of Petitioner, supra note 70, at 9–10, 1910 WL 21009, 
at *9–10. 
 77. Sibbach, 312 U.S. at 14. 
 78. 326 U.S. 99 (1945). 
 79. Id. at 100–01, 109. 
 80. Id. at 107–09; see Ides, supra note 48, at 36–37. 
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substantially the same . . . as it would be if tried in a State court.”81  
Because the expiration of a statute of limitations completely barred 
recovery in a state court, the Supreme Court held that the federal courts 
must apply it and bar recovery as well.82
York’s new standard proved too broad, however, and threatened to sweep 
into federal court any state procedural rule that affected the litigation’s 
outcome.
 
83  For example, in Mississippi Publishing Corp. v. Murphree,84 a 
publisher challenged the validity of Federal Rule 4, which authorized 
statewide service of process, because state rules only permitted service 
within the same district as the courthouse.85  Because the case was filed in 
the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Mississippi, but the 
defendant could only be served in the Southern District,86 a state court 
would have dismissed the claim for improper service of process.87  
Realizing the absurdity of this result, the Court upheld Rule 4 because the 
Enabling Act’s limitation was “obviously not addressed to such incidental 
effects as necessarily attend the adoption of the [Federal Rules].”88  The 
Rule, the Court decided, regulated only “‘the manner and means by which a 
right to recover . . . is enforced’” and was “[i]n this sense . . . a rule of 
procedure and not of substantive right.”89
Mississippi Publishing, however, had little effect in halting Erie’s 
encroachment upon the Federal Rules’ authority.  In Ragan v. Merchants 
Transfer & Warehouse Co.,
 
90 decided in 1949, the Court affirmed the 
dismissal of an action as time barred—even though the complaint was filed 
in federal court within the two-year statute of limitations period—because 
the defendant was served only after that period had expired.91  Although 
Federal Rule 3 provided that the suit “‘commenced by filing a 
complaint,’”92 the Kansas statute of limitations provided that a suit 
commenced only after the plaintiff served the defendant.93
 
 81. York, 326 U.S. at 109; see Ides, supra note 
  As in York, the 
Supreme Court reasoned that the federal court must dismiss the action 
48, at 37–38; see also Dudley & 
Rutherglen, supra note 9, at 729–30 (suggesting that York may have created only a new way 
to discern substance from procedure). 
 82. York, 326 U.S. at 110; see Ides, supra note 48, at 36. 
 83. See 17A MOORE, supra note 36, § 124.01[2], at 124-11; Ides, supra note 48, at 38. 
 84. 326 U.S. 438 (1946). 
 85. Id. at 440, 443.  The corporation also argued for improper venue, but the Court 
confirmed that venue was proper. Id. at 441. 
 86. Id. at 440. 
 87. See Robert P. Wasson, Jr., Resolving Separation of Powers and Federalism 
Problems Raised by Erie, the Rules of Decision Act, and the Rules Enabling Act:  A 
Proposed Solution, 32 CAP. U. L. REV. 519, 607 (2004) (arguing that Mississippi Publishing 
applied York differently than in other Erie cases). 
 88. Miss. Publ’g, 326 U.S. at 445 (citing Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1, 11–14 
(1941)). 
 89. Id. at 446 (first alteration in original) (quoting Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 
99, 109 (1945)). 
 90. 337 U.S. 530 (1949). 
 91. Id. at 531, 533–34. 
 92. Id. at 531 n.1 (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 3). 
 93. Id. at 531 n.4 (citing KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-308 (1935)). 
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because the state court would have done so.94  It refused to consider the 
state law as merely regulating procedure because the Federal Rule would 
have provided a “different measure of the cause of action” and could not 
apply “consistently with Erie.”95
On the same day, in Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp.,
 
96 the 
Court decided that federal courts in New Jersey could not certify a 
derivative class action if the plaintiff shareholder had not posted a bond to 
cover the corporation’s costs, as state law required.97  Although the class 
action satisfied all of the conditions for certification under Federal Rule 23, 
the Court reasoned that the New Jersey statute “create[d] a new liability 
where none existed before” and thus “it would clearly be substantive” if it 
performed no procedural function.98  Departing from Sibbach’s formalistic 
rationale, the Court explained that “[r]ules which lawyers call procedural do 
not always exhaust their effect by regulating procedure.”99
C.  The Court Banishes Erie 
  In this way, 
Erie had begun to preempt even Federal Rules that regulated procedure. 
Sixteen years later, the Supreme Court tried to halt Erie’s sprawling 
advance with the decision in Hanna v. Plumer.100  As in Ragan, the Court 
confronted an inconsistency between the technical requirements of the 
Federal Rules and a state’s statute of limitations,101 although in this 
instance the injured plaintiff had both filed the complaint and served the 
defendant within the statute of limitations period.102  In accordance with the 
service of process requirements in Federal Rule 4(d)(1), Eddie Hanna left 
copies of the summons and complaint at the residence of Edward Plumer, 
the executor of the deceased defendant’s estate.103  Part of Massachusetts’s 
statute of limitations, however, required that an estate’s executor be 
“‘served by delivery in hand’” within the statutory period.104  Relying on 
Ragan and York, the U.S. District Court for the District of Massachusetts 
dismissed Hanna’s case as time-barred, and the First Circuit affirmed, 
reasoning that the in-hand requirement served a substantive purpose.105
The Supreme Court reversed because Erie could not be “invoked to void 
a Federal Rule.”
 
106
 
 94. See id. at 532; Ides, supra note 
  Erie had only interpreted the Rules of Decision Act, 
48, at 44; cf. York, 326 U.S. at 110 (dismissing the 
case because the state court would have). 
 95. Ragan, 337 U.S. at 533–34. 
 96. 337 U.S. 541 (1949). 
 97. Id. at 544–45 & n.1, 556–57. 
 98. Id. at 555–56. 
 99. Id. at 555. 
 100. 380 U.S. 460 (1965). 
 101. Id. at 461–62. 
 102. Id. at 461.  For this reason, the Court distinguished the case from Ragan, deciding 
that the only issue was whether the manner of service was proper. See id. at 462 n.1. 
 103. Id. at 461 (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 4(d)(1)). 
 104. Id. at 462 & n.1 (quoting MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 197, § 9 (1958)). 
 105. Id. at 462; see Ides, supra note 48, at 56. 
 106. Hanna, 380 U.S. at 469–70; see Ely, supra note 1, at 718. 
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which called for state law in the absence of a federal statute,107 but the 
Enabling Act required federal courts to apply a relevant Federal Rule unless 
the original drafters had “erred in their prima facie judgment that the 
Rule . . . transgresse[d] neither the terms of the Enabling Act nor 
constitutional restrictions.”108  The Court held that Federal Rule 4(d)(1) 
was clearly both constitutional, because Congress could regulate matters 
“rationally capable of classification as either” substance or procedure,109 
and consistent with the Enabling Act, because it related to court procedure 
and practice.110  Thus, Rule 4(d)(1) applied and Plumer was properly served 
within the statutory period.111
Of course, this holding conflicted with Ragan, where the Court reasoned 
that applying the Federal Rule was inconsistent with Erie’s command.
 
112  
The Hanna Court distinguished Ragan as an instance where “the scope of 
the Federal Rule was not as broad as the losing party urged” and thus the 
Rule did not govern the issue before the Court.113  In Hanna, the conflict 
was “unavoidable” because “Rule 4(d)(1) sa[id]—implicitly, but with 
unmistakable clarity—that in-hand service [was] not required in federal 
courts.”114  Therefore, the Rule was on point and Erie had no authority to 
dictate what law applied.115
Hoping to further restrain Erie, the Court proceeded to examine which 
law would have applied under that doctrine, even though its Enabling Act 
interpretation was sufficient to decide the case.
 
116  The Court clarified that 
York did not require federal courts to duplicate the result in state courts,117
 
 107. See Hanna, 380 U.S. at 471–72 (noting that Erie only required application of state 
law in the absence of a constitutional provision or federal statute); Ely, supra note 
 
1, at 718 
(noting that “Hanna’s main point” was that “the Rules Enabling Act—and not the Rules of 
Decision Act construed by Erie R.R. v. Tompkins”—governed the Federal Rules’ validity). 
 108. Hanna, 380 U.S. at 471. 
 109. Id. at 472. 
 110. Id. at 464–65 (citing Miss. Publ’g Corp. v. Murphree, 326 U.S. 438, 445–46 (1946); 
Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1, 14 (1941)); see Ides, supra note 48, at 56–57; cf. supra 
notes 72–77, 88–89 and accompanying text (discussing Sibbach’s and Mississippi 
Publishing’s interpretation of Enabling Act). 
 111. Hanna, 380 U.S. at 474. 
 112. See Ragan v. Merchs. Transfer & Warehouse Co., 337 U.S. 530, 533–34 (1949); 
Jeffrey L. Rensberger, Hanna’s Unruly Family:  An Opinion for Shady Grove Orthopedic 
Associates v. Allstate Insurance, 44 CREIGHTON L. REV. 89, 90–91 (2010) (“[T]he reasoning 
of Hanna—that Rule 3 was ‘not as broad’ as was asserted—is alien to Ragan itself.”). 
 113. Hanna, 380 U.S. at 470 & n.12 (citing Ragan v. Merchs. Transfer & Warehouse Co., 
337 U.S. 530 (1949)); see Ely, supra note 1, at 730 (describing the Hanna Court as “at great 
pains” to distinguish Ragan). 
 114. Hanna, 380 U.S. at 470. 
 115. See id. 
 116. Ely, supra note 1, at 710 (“[The Court] saw fit . . . to add a considered dictum on the 
question of what law would have been applicable had there been no such Rule and thus a 
genuine Erie problem been presented.”); cf. supra note 54 (discussing how Erie’s 
unnecessary constitutional reasoning may have led courts to allow Erie to preempt the 
Federal Rules); infra notes 372–75 and accompanying text (arguing that dicta in Justice 
Stevens’s opinion in Shady Grove led to similarly unintended consequences).  
 117. See Hanna, 380 U.S. at 466–67 (deciding that York’s outcome-determinative test 
was “never intended to serve as a talisman”); id. at 468–69 (explaining that outcomes can 
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but only to apply those state laws that implicated “the twin aims of the Erie 
rule:  discouragement of forum-shopping and avoidance of inequitable 
administration of the laws.”118  Because Massachusetts’s in-hand service 
requirement had not influenced the plaintiff’s choice between filing in 
federal or state court, the Court decided that Erie would not have required 
state law to apply “even if there were no Federal Rule” on point.119  
Ironically, this gratuitous dictum would eventually undo Hanna’s efforts.  If 
the state law would not have applied anyway, Hanna was consistent with 
the prevailing rule it intended to eradicate:  the Federal Rules only applied 
when Erie did not require state law.120
D.  Erie Returns in Disguise 
 
Although Hanna should have implicitly overruled Ragan,121 the trickster 
Erie changed shape and turned Hanna’s dictum against it.  Just like Ragan, 
Walker v. Armco Steel Corp.122 presented the Supreme Court with a 
plaintiff who had filed the complaint within the statute of limitations period, 
according to Federal Rule 3, but had not served the defendant within that 
time, as required by the state statute.123  Even though Hanna’s holding had 
abrogated Ragan’s reasoning—that the state law must apply because Erie 
prevented the Rule’s application—the Court reaffirmed Ragan and again 
decided that the state law must apply.124  Because Hanna had distinguished 
Ragan as an instance where the Federal Rule was not broad enough to 
control the issue,125 the Court decided that Hanna required federal courts to 
first determine the Federal Rule’s scope.126  Although cautioning that this 
first step was not a license to “narrowly construe[] [the Rules] in order to 
avoid a ‘direct collision’ with state law,”127
 
vary if “the difference between the two rules would be of scant, if any, relevance to the 
choice of a forum”). 
 the Court found no indication 
 118. Id. at 468; see Ely, supra note 1, at 710–13. 
 119. Hanna, 380 U.S. at 466, 469–70; see Ides, supra note 48, at 58.  It is unclear what 
law would govern if there were no federal law on point and Erie did not require federal 
courts to apply state law. Compare Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938) 
(holding that state law must apply in the absence of an applicable constitutional provision or 
act of Congress), with Semtek Int’l Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 531 U.S. 497, 508 (2001) 
(holding that, in the absence of any controlling federal law, “federal common law governs 
the claim-preclusive effect of a dismissal by a federal court sitting in diversity”). 
 120. See, e.g., Ragan v. Merchs. Transfer & Warehouse Co., 337 U.S. 530, 534 (1949) 
(holding that applying the Federal Rule would violate Erie); Miss. Publ’g Corp. v. 
Murphree, 326 U.S. 438, 446 (1946) (holding that a Federal Rule could apply if it did not 
affect “the rules of decision by which th[e] [federal] court will adjudicate [the state’s] 
rights”). 
 121. See Dudley & Rutherglen, supra note 9, at 734 & n.129; Ely, supra note 1, at     
729–32.  See generally Douglas G. Thompson, Federal Rule 3 and the Tolling of State 
Statutes of Limitations in Diversity Cases, 20 STAN. L. REV. 1281 (1968) (analyzing the 
impact of Hanna on Ragan). 
 122. 446 U.S. 740 (1980). 
 123. Id. at 742–43. 
 124. Id. at 752–53. 
 125. Id. 
 126. Id. at 749–50; see Ides, supra note 48, at 62. 
 127. Walker, 446 U.S. at 750 n.9. 
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that Rule 3 was intended to toll statutes of limitations.  The Rule only 
governed the date by which a court calculated the other Rules’ procedural 
deadlines,128 whereas the state statute of limitations represented substantive 
decisions about a defendant’s freedom from defending stale claims.129  As 
there was no conflict, Erie governed and demanded the application of the 
state statute to avoid “an ‘inequitable administration’ of the law.”130
Initially, the Court tried to prevent Walker’s new approach from 
undermining the Rules.  In 1987, a unanimous Court in Burlington 
Northern Railroad Co. v. Wood
  Thus, 
Erie and the substance-procedure dichotomy returned as the measuring 
stick of the Rules’ scope. 
131 added teeth to Walker’s instruction to 
give the Rules their plain meaning and to avoid narrow constructions.132  In 
that case, the defendant had lost at trial, posted a bond to stay enforcement 
of the judgment, and then lost its subsequent appeal.133  The Eleventh 
Circuit then assessed a mandatory penalty against the defendant, pursuant to 
Alabama law, for staying the judgment to pursue an unsuccessful appeal.134  
Under Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 38, however, assessing such a 
penalty was not mandatory; rather, the Courts of Appeals had discretion to 
assess a penalty if it determined that the appeal was frivolous.135  The 
Supreme Court vacated the penalty because the Federal Rule’s discretionary 
provision “unmistakably conflict[ed] with the mandatory provision” of the 
state statute.136  Thus, under Hanna, the Rule had to apply unless it was 
unconstitutional or exceeded the Enabling Act’s authorization.137  Although 
the Enabling Act prohibited the Rules from “‘abridg[ing], enlarg[ing] or 
modify[ing] any substantive right,’”138 the Court reasoned that Congress’s 
intent to create a uniform system of procedural rules “suggest[ed] that Rules 
which incidentally affect litigants’ substantive rights do not violate this 
provision if [such effects are] reasonably necessary to maintain the integrity 
of that system.”139  Without deciding whether the state law was substantive 
for Erie purposes,140
 
 128. Id. at 750–51; cf. supra note 
 the Court held that the Enabling Act authorized 
45 (noting the Advisory Committee’s uncertainty as to 
whether the Enabling Act authorizes Federal Rule 3 to toll a statute of limitations). 
 129. Walker, 446 U.S. at 751 (citing Ely, supra note 1, at 730–31). 
 130. Id. at 752–53 (quoting Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 468 (1965)). 
 131. 480 U.S. 1 (1987). 
 132. Id. at 4–5 (citing Walker, 446 U.S. at 750 n.9 (“This is not to suggest that the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure are to be narrowly construed in order to avoid a ‘direct collision’ 
with state law.  The Federal Rules should be given their plain meaning.”)); see Ides, supra 
note 48, at 63–64. 
 133. Burlington N., 480 U.S. at 2–3; see Ides, supra note 48, at 63. 
 134. Burlington N., 480 U.S. at 3; see Ides, supra note 48, at 63. 
 135. Burlington N., 480 U.S. at 4; see FED. R. APP. P. 38. 
 136. Burlington N., 480 U.S. at 7. 
 137. Id. at 5; see Ides, supra note 48, at 64. 
 138. Burlington N., 480 U.S. at 5 (quoting Rules Enabling Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1982)); 
see Ides, supra note 48, at 64. 
 139. Burlington N., 480 U.S. at 5; see Ides, supra note 48, at 64. 
 140. The Courts of Appeals were divided on whether the state law was substantive.  In the 
decision below, the Eleventh Circuit had decided it was substantive, in reliance on a Fifth 
Circuit case—decided while the Eleventh Circuit was part of the Fifth Circuit—that 
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Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 38 because it could “reasonably be 
classified as procedural” and “affect[ed] only the process of enforcing 
litigants’ rights.”141
The Court’s subsequent decisions, however, directed the federal courts to 
do as Walker did—not as it said—and narrowly construe the Rules.  The 
Court first moved away from Burlington Northern in 1996 with its decision 
in Gasperini v. Center for Humanities, Inc.
 
142  A jury had awarded William 
Gasperini $450,000 in compensatory damages for 300 lost photographic 
slides.143  Because of the excessive award, the defendant moved for a new 
trial pursuant to Federal Rule 59, which permitted new trials “‘for any of 
the reasons for which new trials have heretofore been granted in actions at 
law in the courts of the United States,’” but the U.S. District Court for the 
Southern District of New York denied the motion.144  The Second Circuit 
vacated the judgment, reasoning that Erie required federal courts to apply 
the New York standard of review for new trials145—whether the jury award 
“‘deviate[d] materially’” from comparable awards146—instead of the 
federal district courts’ traditional “shocks the conscience”147 or the 
appellate courts’ “abuse of discretion” standards.148  Applying the 
“materially deviates” standard itself, the Second Circuit ordered a new trial 
unless Gasperini would accept a reduced award of $100,000.149
The Supreme Court vacated the Second Circuit’s decision.
 
150  Although 
the majority agreed that New York’s “materially deviates” standard must 
apply under Erie because it served a “manifestly substantive” purpose,151 
the standard of review applied by the Courts of Appeals was “‘a matter of 
federal law.’”152
 
considered the state law a “‘non-federal substantive matter.’” Burlington N., 480 U.S. at 6 
n.4 (quoting Proctor v. Gissendaner, 587 F.2d 182, 184 (5th Cir. 1979)).  After its separation 
from the Fifth Circuit, the Eleventh Circuit adopted Gissendaner as binding precedent. Id.  
The Fifth Circuit, however, explicitly overruled Gissendaner in holding that an identical 
Mississippi statute “confer[red] no substantive right.” Affholder, Inc. v. S. Rock, Inc., 746 
F.2d 305, 311 (5th Cir. 1984) (“Proctor v. Gissendaner no longer express[es] the law of the 
circuit.”).  The Supreme Court did not resolve the split.  It did, however, suggest that the 
state law was not substantive because it found Affholder “persuasive,” Burlington N., 480 
U.S. at 6–7, and reasoned that the Federal Rule’s choice of a “discretionary procedure” 
instead of a mandatory one “affect[ed] only the process of enforcing litigants’ rights and not 
the rights themselves,” id. at 8. 
  Only the federal district court could apply the state 
 141. Burlington N., 480 U.S. at 8. 
 142. 518 U.S. 415 (1996). 
 143. Id. at 419–20. 
 144. Id. at 467–68 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (emphasis omitted) (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 59). 
 145. Id. at 420, 426 (majority opinion). 
 146. Id. at 420, 425 (quoting N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5501(c) (McKinney 1996)). 
 147. Id. at 422. 
 148. Id. at 438. 
 149. Id. at 421, 431. 
 150. Id. at 439. 
 151. Id. at 429–30; see Dudley & Rutherglen, supra note 9, at 711. 
 152. Gasperini, 518 U.S. at 437 (alteration in original) (quoting Donovan v. Penn 
Shipping Co., 429 U.S. 648, 649 (1977) (per curiam)); see Dudley & Rutherglen, supra note 
9, at 711.  The Court’s reasoning relied in part on Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Electrical 
Cooperative, Inc., 356 U.S. 525 (1958). See Gasperini, 518 U.S. at 436 n.21 (citing Byrd, 
356 U.S. at 537).  Described by two commentators as “the Rodney Dangerfield of the Erie 
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standard “without disrupting the federal system.”153  The dissent objected 
because Rule 59 only permitted the district court to apply a standard 
previously used by “‘the courts of the United States’”—that is, a federal 
standard.154  The majority rejected this interpretation because federal courts 
must interpret the Federal Rules’ scope “with sensitivity to important state 
interests and regulatory policies.”155  Apparently ignoring Burlington 
Northern, the majority incorrectly observed that the Court had interpreted 
the Rules to avoid conflict since Hanna because the Enabling Act did not 
authorize the Rules to affect substantive rights.156  The majority decided 
that Rule 59 only required a federal court to grant a new trial for a 
traditional reason, such as excessiveness, but that state law must determine 
excessiveness.157  Thus, Erie had transformed again into a “sensitivity to 
important state interests.”158  By invoking the Enabling Act’s prohibition 
against affecting substantive rights,159 Gasperini suggested that Erie not 
only influenced the Rules’ scope, but also governed their validity under the 
Enabling Act.160
 
doctrine,” Richard D. Freer & Thomas C. Arthur, The Irrepressible Influence of Byrd, 44 
CREIGHTON L. REV. 61, 61 (2010), Byrd required federal courts performing an Erie analysis 
to balance the state’s interest in applying state law against the countervailing federal interest 
in allocating court functions, see Byrd, 356 U.S. at 536–38.  Further discussion of Byrd is 
beyond the scope of this Note, but for an argument that the scheme articulated in Byrd 
explains the Court’s inconsistent results and that a majority in Shady Grove employed this 
scheme, see generally Freer & Arthur, supra. 
 
 153. Gasperini, 518 U.S. at 437–38; see Dudley & Rutherglen, supra note 9, at 710–11.  
For criticism of this outcome, see generally Armando Gustavo Hernandez, The Head-on 
Collision of Gasperini and the Derailment of Erie:  Exposing the Futility of the 
Accommodation Doctrine, 44 CREIGHTON L. REV. 191 (2010) (criticizing Gasperini’s 
command to accommodate state law as unworkable and arguing for elimination of that 
doctrine). 
 154. Gasperini, 518 U.S. at 467–68 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 59); 
see Dudley & Rutherglen, supra note 9, at 713–14 (arguing that Rule 59 “takes a completely 
backward-looking view of the power to grant new trials . . . limit[ing] its view entirely to 
prior federal practice”). 
 155. Gasperini, 518 U.S. at 427 n.7 (majority opinion) (citing Walker v. Armco Steel 
Corp., 446 U.S. 740, 750–52 (1980)). 
 156. Id. at 437 n.22 (citing Rules Enabling Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b) (1994); RICHARD H. 
FALLON ET AL., HART AND WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM, 
729–30 (4th ed. 1996)); see Dudley & Rutherglen, supra note 9, at 714–15 (arguing that the 
Gasperini majority interpreted the Rule narrowly to avoid the Enabling Act’s prohibition on 
affecting substantive rights). But see Burlington N. R.R. Co. v. Woods, 480 U.S. 1, 5, 7 
(1987) (holding that Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 38 “unmistakably conflict[ed]” 
with the state law and interpreting the Enabling Act to authorize incidental effects on 
substantive rights). 
 157. Gasperini, 518 U.S. at 437 n.22. 
 158. Id. at 427 n.7. 
 159. See id. at 437 n.22 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b)). 
 160. Compare id. at 427–28 & n.7 (determining whether the “materially deviates” 
standard is “‘substantive’ or ‘procedural’ for Erie purposes” and noting that the Federal 
Rules should be interpreted “with sensitivity to important state interests”), with id. at 437 
n.22 (arguing that Federal Rule 59 should be interpreted to avoid conflict with the 
“materially deviates” standard because the Enabling Act does not authorize the Rules to 
affect “‘any substantive right’” (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b))). See generally Richard D. 
Freer, Some Thoughts on the State of Erie After Gasperini, 76 TEX. L. REV. 1637, 1641–44 
(1998) (arguing that Gasperini “embrace[d] a new general policy regarding interpretation of 
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By the time of the Court’s decision in Semtek International Inc. v. 
Lockheed Martin Corp.161 in 2001, it had become clear that Erie had 
returned.162  There, the U.S. District Court for the Central District of 
California had dismissed Semtek’s contract claim because California’s two-
year statute of limitations had expired.163  Semtek then filed the same 
contract claim in a Maryland state court, where the statute of limitations ran 
for three years.164  The state trial court dismissed the claim as precluded by 
the prior dismissal in California because, under Federal Rule 41, the federal 
court’s dismissal “‘operate[d] as an adjudication upon the merits.’”165  
California law, however, did not grant preclusive effect to a dismissal on 
statute of limitations grounds.166  The Supreme Court reversed the 
dismissal because Rule 41 would violate both the Enabling Act and Erie if 
it governed the preclusive effect of judgments and extinguished a 
substantive right that still existed under California law.167  Deciding that the 
phrase “on the merits” in Rule 41 was ambiguous,168 the Court interpreted 
it to mean only that the same plaintiff could not return to the same federal 
court with the same claim.169  With Rule 41 construed narrowly, there was 
no Federal Rule or federal statute on point.170  Reasoning that federal law 
must govern the preclusive effect of a federal judgment, the Court decided 
the issue as a matter of “federal common law.”171  In accordance with Erie, 
the Court decided that federal common law required the application of state 
preclusion rules.172
Thus, Erie had returned in a new shadowy form—or perhaps had never 
left.  Before Hanna, the Supreme Court explicitly reasoned that federal 
courts could not apply the Federal Rules if Erie required a contrary state 
law.
 
173
 
the Federal Rules” because “the ‘substantive rights’ limitation of the [Enabling Act] counsels 
such sensitive interpretation” (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b))). 
  After Hanna, the Supreme Court still refused to apply the Federal 
 161. 531 U.S. 497 (2001). 
 162. See id. at 503–04. 
 163. Id. at 499. 
 164. Id. 
 165. Id. at 501 (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 41(b)). 
 166. See id. at 500–01. 
 167. Id. at 503–04, 509; see Ralph U. Whitten, Shady Grove Orthopedic Associates, P.A. 
v. Allstate Insurance Co.:  Justice Whitten, Nagging in Part and Declaring a Pox on All 
Houses, 44 CREIGHTON L. REV. 115, 120 (2010) (“[T]he Court made its clearly tortured 
interpretation of Rule 41(b) out of fear that the rule would violate the Enabling Act if given a 
straightforward interpretation and the judgment held claim preclusive.”). 
 168. Semtek, 531 U.S. at 501–03. But see Dudley & Rutherglen, supra note 9, at 722–23 
(arguing that the Court exaggerated this ambiguity because all jurisdictions grant preclusive 
effect to any judgment that the rendering court deems “on the merits”). 
 169. Semtek, 531 U.S. at 505–06. But see Dudley & Rutherglen, supra note 9, at 723 
(noting that the Court’s interpretation “originated in Semtek itself” and has not been used in 
any other court). 
 170. Semtek, 531 U.S. at 506–08. 
 171. Id. 
 172. Id. at 508–09 (citing Dupasseur v. Rochereau, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 130, 135 (1874)); 
cf. supra note 119 and accompanying text (discussing Hanna’s suggestion that Erie may not 
require application of state law even in the absence of federal law). 
 173. See supra notes 95, 98–99 and accompanying text. 
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Rules where Erie required state law, but for different reasons.174  Hanna 
and its progeny had established a separate, two-step Enabling Act analysis, 
but it was not truly free from Erie’s influence.175  In the first step, federal 
courts had to determine whether the Federal Rule conflicted with the state 
law,176 but Gasperini directed the courts to interpret the Rules “with 
sensitivity to important state interests” and to avoid any conflict with a 
contrary state law.177  In other words, they should interpret the Rules to 
avoid conflicts with Erie,178 because Erie governed if the Federal Rules 
were not broad enough to control the issue.179
If there was an unavoidable conflict, the second step required courts to 
determine whether the Enabling Act authorized the Rule.
 
180  Burlington 
Northern held that a Federal Rule fell within this authorization if it could 
“reasonably be classified as procedural,” “affect[ed] only the process of 
enforcing litigants’ rights,” and had no more than an incidental effect on 
substantive rights.181  In that case, however, the Supreme Court never 
decided which law Erie would have required,182 so it remained possible that 
Gasperini’s and Semtek’s suggestion was true:  a Federal Rule that would 
violate Erie might also violate the Enabling Act.183
In its new form, Erie disrupted the Federal Rules more than it had when 
it explicitly preempted them.
 
184  For example, before Gasperini, Federal 
Rule 59 only permitted federal courts to use federal standards for granting 
new trials.185  Afterwards, not only did federal courts have to apply any 
substantive state standard—with no guidance on which were 
substantive186—but any federal court also had the option to apply New 
York’s “deviates materially” standard because a “court[] of the United 
States”187 had used it to grant a new trial.188  Similarly, Semtek’s decision 
that Federal Rule 41 had no preclusive effect could frustrate the application 
of other Rules that implicate claim preclusion.189
 
 174. See supra notes 
  For instance, under the 
128–30, 155–59, 167–72 and accompanying text. 
 175. See Ides, supra note 48, at 61–62. 
 176. See id. at 80. 
 177. Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415, 427 n.7 (1996); see supra notes 
155–59 and accompanying text. 
 178. See supra notes 130, 151, 167, 172 and accompanying text. 
 179. See Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 470 (1965). 
 180. See id. at 471; Ides, supra note 48, at 80. 
 181. Burlington N. R.R. Co. v. Woods, 480 U.S. 1, 5, 8 (1987) (quoting Hanna, 380 U.S. 
at 472); see supra notes 137–41 and accompanying text. 
 182. See supra note 140. 
 183. See Semtek Int’l, Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 531 U.S. 497, 503–04 (2001); 
Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415, 437 n.22 (1996) (citing Rules Enabling 
Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b) (1994)); supra notes 156, 159–60, 167 and accompanying text. 
 184. See Dudley & Rutherglen, supra note 9, at 735–36 (arguing that cases like Walker, 
Gasperini, and Semtek have created two sets of Federal Rules:  one for diversity cases, and 
one for federal cases); id. at 747–48 (concluding that narrow interpretations “compromise[] 
the entire federal court system”). 
 185. See id. at 713. 
 186. See id. at 716. 
 187. FED. R. CIV. P. 59(a)(1). 
 188. See Dudley & Rutherglen, supra note 9, at 717. 
 189. See id. at 724–25. 
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compulsory counterclaim rule in Federal Rule 13(a), parties must raise 
certain related counterclaims in the same litigation; if they do not, those 
parties are barred from raising those claims in subsequent actions.190  After 
Semtek, parties could probably still raise these claims in states that did not 
grant those unraised claims preclusive effect.191
II.  THE EPIC DECISION IN SHADY GROVE 
  Not only had Erie the 
trickster eluded the Court’s control, it had also transformed into a more 
powerful and confounding force. 
The Supreme Court finally broke the unspoken rule in 2010 in Shady 
Grove Orthopedic Associates, P.A. v. Allstate Insurance Co.,192 when it 
applied a Federal Rule, even though Erie would have required the 
application of state law.193  Shady Grove had filed a putative class action in 
the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of New York seeking to 
recover the interest that Allstate owed to them and other insurance 
claimants under New York law.194  A New York statute requires insurance 
companies to pay claims within thirty days, or else pay the claim with 
interest at a fixed rate.195  Allstate allegedly paid Shady Grove’s claim after 
thirty days, but refused to pay the accrued interest of approximately 
$500.196  In the class action, Shady Grove sought to recover approximately 
$5,000,000 in accrued interest that Allstate allegedly owed to all New York 
claimants.197
Regardless of whether the complaint met the class action requirements 
set forth in Federal Rule 23,
 
198 Allstate moved to dismiss it because New 
York’s class action rule, Civil Procedure Law and Rule (C.P.L.R.) 901(b), 
provides that “‘an action to recover a penalty . . . imposed by statute may 
not be maintained as a class action.’”199  The district court granted 
Allstate’s motion to dismiss because Erie required it to apply C.P.L.R. 
901(b).200  The Second Circuit affirmed,201
 
 190. See FED. R. CIV. P. 13(a); Baker v. Gold Seal Liquors, Inc., 417 U.S. 467, 469 & n.1 
(1974) (interpreting Federal Rule 13(a) in the context of a federal bankruptcy claim). 
 reasoning that C.P.L.R. 901(b) 
 191. See Dudley & Rutherglen, supra note 9, at 725. 
 192. 130 S. Ct. 1431 (2010). 
 193. See id. at 1443 (plurality opinion); id. at 1456–57 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
 194. Id. at 1436–37 (plurality opinion). 
 195. See id. at 1436 (citing N.Y. INS. LAW. § 5106(a) (McKinney 2009)). 
 196. Id. at 1436–37. 
 197. See id. at 1437 & n.3; id. at 1460 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (describing the putative 
class action as an “attempt to transform a $500 case into a $5,000,000 award”). 
 198. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23. 
 199. Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1436 n.1, 1437 (plurality opinion) (quoting N.Y. C.P.L.R. 
901(b) (McKinney 2006)). 
 200. Id. at 1437.  Because the lower courts held that N.Y. C.P.L.R. 901(b) prevented them 
from certifying the class, Shady Grove could only seek $500 in damages, and thus the 
complaint sought far less than the minimum amount-in-controversy necessary to invoke the 
federal courts’ diversity jurisdiction. See Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1437 & n.3; cf. 28 
U.S.C. § 1332(a) (2006) (more than $75,000); Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 (CAFA), 
28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(2) (more than $5,000,000 in aggregate). 
 201. Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1437 (plurality opinion); Shady Grove Orthopedic 
Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 549 F.3d 137, 146 (2d Cir. 2008). 
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is substantive because it governs the “remedies [that] may be sought by 
class action plaintiffs,” while Rule 23 does not.202
The Supreme Court reversed the Second Circuit’s ruling and ordered the 
district court to apply Federal Rule 23, even though C.P.L.R. 901(b) would 
have applied under Erie.
 
203  As with each previous episode in the Court’s 
Erie odyssey, however, the decision possesses a fatal Achilles’ heel that 
ultimately has allowed Erie to escape its restrictions.  This time the flaw is a 
lack of consensus.  The Court unanimously agreed on the two-step Enabling 
Act analysis:  first, determine the Rule’s scope, and second, if the Rule is on 
point, determine whether the Enabling Act authorizes the Rule.204  The 
four-Justice dissent, however, advocated interpreting Rule 23 “‘with 
sensitivity’” to avoid any conflict with state law, as the lower courts had 
and as the Supreme Court had in Gasperini and Semtek.205  The five-Justice 
majority disagreed, but wrote opposing plurality and concurring opinions 
explaining how to determine when the Enabling Act authorizes a Federal 
Rule to violate Erie.206  Furthermore, Justice Sotomayor parted ways with 
the rest of the four-Justice plurality on one part of its opinion.207
This part analyzes the two opinions that concurred in the Shady Grove 
judgment.  Part II.A examines Justice Scalia’s plurality opinion, which 
argued for a broad test that would endorse the Rules’ validity in almost all 
situations.  Part II.B discusses Justice Stevens’s more nuanced approach, 
 
 
 202. Shady Grove, 549 F.3d at 143. 
 203. Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1443, 1447–48 (plurality opinion); id. at 1459–60 
(Stevens, J., concurring). 
 204. Id. at 1437 (plurality opinion); id. at 1448 (Stevens, J., concurring); id. at 1460–61 
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 205. Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1463–64, 1465–66, 1473 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) 
(quoting Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415, 427 n.7 (1996)).  One 
commentator has suggested that the division between the majority and the dissent can be 
explained by the two competing views of the class action as either “a sophisticated joinder 
device” or “a creation that transform[s] the substantive law.” Alexandra D. Lahav, Two 
Views of the Class Action, 79 FORDHAM L. REV. 1939, 1942 (2011).  Further analysis of 
Justice Ginsburg’s opinion is beyond this Note’s scope because no lower court has followed 
it as the holding, although a few note that Justice Stevens and the four dissenting Justices 
formed a majority that would preserve the application of some state procedural laws. See 
Godin v. Schencks, 629 F.3d 79, 87 (1st Cir. 2010); In re Digital Music Antitrust Litig., No. 
06 MD 1780, 2011 WL 2848195, at *18 (S.D.N.Y. July 18, 2011); In re Wellbutrin XL 
Antitrust Litig., 756 F. Supp. 2d 670, 675 (E.D. Pa. 2010); Estate of C.A. v. Grier, 752 F. 
Supp. 2d 763, 767 (S.D. Tex. 2010).  For an in-depth analysis of the dissenting opinion, see 
Linda S. Mullenix, Federal Class Actions:  A Near-Death Experience in a Shady Grove, 79 
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 448, 477–79 (2011). 
 206. See Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1436 (plurality opinion); id. at 1448 (Stevens, J., 
concurring). 
 207. See id. at 1436 (plurality opinion) (noting that Justice Sotomayor joined the plurality 
opinion as to Parts II.A, B, and D, but that only Chief Justice Roberts, and Justices Thomas 
and Scalia joined Part II.C).  Because she did not write a separate opinion, it is unclear 
precisely why Justice Sotomayor joined only these parts of the plurality’s opinion.  Based on 
her line of questioning during oral argument, it appears that Justice Sotomayor joined the 
plurality because of her concern about “the larger implications for class action practice” and 
the possibility that “a state could pass a law that said no cause of action could be brought as 
a class action ever.” Mullenix, supra note 205, at 466–67.  In Part IV, this Note argues that 
Justice Sotomayor generally agreed with the plurality, but believed the scope of the Enabling 
Act’s authority was narrower than the other three justices did. 
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which would prevent the Rules from displacing state procedural rules that 
are “intertwined”208 with substantive rights.  Finally, Part II.C analyzes 
each opinion under the Marks v. United States209
A.  Justice Scalia’s Opinion 
 doctrine, which 
determines the Court’s holding when it fails to reach a majority opinion. 
Applying the two-step Enabling Act framework, Justice Scalia began his 
analysis by determining Rule 23’s scope.210  Because Justice Stevens joined 
this portion of the plurality opinion, Justice Scalia wrote for the majority 
when he held that both class action rules “attempt[] to answer the same 
question.”211  The majority refused to interpret Rule 23 “with sensitivity to 
important state interests”212 if that approach means artificially narrowing 
the Rule’s scope to always avoid a conflict.213  Distinguishing the Court’s 
earlier decision in Semtek, the majority decided the command to interpret 
the Rules “with sensitivity” only applies when the Rule is ambiguous and 
capable of two possible meanings.214  Where the Rule is clear, the Court 
cannot “contort [the Rule’s] text” to avoid conflict.215  The majority 
rejected the Second Circuit’s reasoning that C.P.L.R. 901(b), unlike Rule 
23, determines the threshold issue of whether a particular claim was eligible 
for class treatment.216  It found no reason to “read Rule 23 as addressing 
only whether claims made eligible for class treatment by some other law 
should be certified as class actions.”217  “By its terms,” the majority 
decided, Rule 23 sets forth the criteria necessary for proceeding as a class 
action.218  Because C.P.L.R. 901(b) sets forth a competing set of criteria, 
the Court decided that the two plainly conflict.219
Having found a conflict, Justice Scalia—writing only for the four-Justice 
plurality
 
220
 
 208. Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1452 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
—proceeded to determine whether the Enabling Act authorizes 
 209. 430 U.S. 188 (1977). 
 210. Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1437 (plurality opinion); see Mullenix, supra note 205, at 
470–71. 
 211. Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1437 (plurality opinion); see id. at 1448 (Stevens, J., 
concurring) (noting that Justice Stevens joined this part of Justice Scalia’s opinion); 
Mullenix, supra note 205, at 471. 
 212. Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415, 427 n.7, 438 n.22 (1996); see 
Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1460 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 213. Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1441 & n.7 (plurality opinion). 
 214. Id. at 1441–42 (citing Semtek Int’l Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 531 U.S. 497, 
503–04 (2001)); see Freer & Arthur, supra note 152, at 74. But see Dudley & Rutherglen, 
supra note 9, at 722–23 (arguing that Semtek created an artificial ambiguity). 
 215. Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1442 (plurality opinion) (citing Walker v. Armco Steel 
Corp., 446 U.S. 740, 750 n.9 (1980) (“This is not to suggest that the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure are to be narrowly construed in order to avoid a ‘direct collision’ with state 
law.”)). 
 216. Id. at 1438; see Mullenix, supra note 205, at 471. 
 217. Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1438 (plurality opinion). 
 218. Id. at 1437. 
 219. Id. 
 220. Id. at 1436. 
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Rule 23.221  Invoking the original Sibbach test, Scalia insisted that a Federal 
Rule is valid so long as it “‘really regulate[s] procedure.’”222  Under the 
plurality’s test, “the substantive nature of [the state] law, or its substantive 
purpose, makes no difference.”223  In fact, Scalia’s test would not consider 
the nature of the state law at all.224  Procedural rules invariably affect 
substantive rights, Scalia reasoned, but the proper test should not depend on 
whether there is an effect on substantive rights.225  It should depend on 
“what the rule itself regulates:  [i]f it governs only ‘the manner and the 
means’ by which the litigants’ rights are enforced,” rather than “‘the rules 
of decision by which [the] court will adjudicate [those] rights,’” it falls 
within the Enabling Act’s authorization.226
In Part II.C of his opinion, which Justice Sotomayor did not join,
 
227 
Justice Scalia insisted that a Federal Rule that “‘really regulates procedure’” 
can displace even state procedural rules that define the scope of substantive 
rights.228  Justice Stevens’s concern for the substantive nature of the state 
law, he argued, “mist[ook] what the Federal Rule regulates for its incidental 
effects.”229  Scalia reasoned that it is necessary to ignore the state law and 
consider only the Federal Rule to prevent the Rules’ validity from 
“turn[ing] on the idiosyncrasies of state law.”230  The Federal Rules cannot 
be “valid in some jurisdictions and invalid in others—or valid in some cases 
and invalid in others.”231  Even though Scalia’s test would promote the kind 
of forum shopping that Erie prohibits, he argued that such an outcome is the 
“inevitable (indeed, one might say the intended) result of a uniform system 
of federal procedure.”232
Applying this test, the plurality decided that Rule 23 only regulates the 
federal courts’ ability to join claims into a single lawsuit and therefore 
 
 
 221. See Mullenix, supra note 205, at 472. 
 222. Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1442 (plurality opinion) (quoting Sibbach v. Wilson & 
Co., 312 U.S. 1, 14 (1941)). 
 223. Id. at 1444; see Debra Lyn Bassett, Enabling the Federal Rules, 44 CREIGHTON L. 
REV. 7, 19–20 (2010) (arguing that a Rule’s validity must be determined at “the time of the 
Federal Rule’s promulgation” to avoid “fishing for ways to undermine the Rules Enabling 
Act by searching for a substantive impact”). 
 224. See Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct at 1445 n.10 (plurality opinion). 
 225. Id. at 1442 (citing Miss. Publ’g Corp. v. Murphree, 326 U.S. 438, 445 (1946)).  
Scalia cited Hanna, Sibbach, and Burlington Northern as instances in which the Court 
permitted the Rules to have “some practical effect on the parties’ rights.” Id. at 1442–43 
(citing Burlington N. R.R. Co. v. Woods, 480 U.S. 1, 8 (1987); Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 
460, 463–65 (1965); Sibbach, 312 U.S. at 14–16). 
 226. Id. at 1442 (plurality opinion) (second and third alterations in original) (quoting 
Miss. Publ’g Corp., 326 U.S. at 446). 
 227. See id. at 1436. 
 228. Id. at 1446 n.13 (quoting Sibbach, 312 U.S. at 14). 
 229. Id. at 1445 n.10. 
 230. Id. at 1445 (citing Sibbach, 312 U.S. at 14); see Bassett, supra note 223, at 25 (“The 
inquiry is not whether some state provision . . . does or could conflict with the Federal Rule; 
indeed such an approach would turn the Rules Enabling Act on its head by potentially 
invalidating any Federal Rule when a state law touches on the same area as that Federal 
Rule.”). 
 231. Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1444 (plurality opinion). 
 232. Id. at 1448. 
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really regulates “only the process for enforcing [substantive] rights.”233  
Although certifying the class increased the potential damages from $500 to 
$5,000,000, Rule 23 had no impact on Allstate’s substantive liability, Scalia 
reasoned, because Allstate had the same liability whether the plaintiffs 
proceeded individually or as a class.234  The increased likelihood that all of 
these plaintiffs would actually pursue their claims once the district court 
certified the class action was “just the sort of ‘incidental effec[t]’” that did 
not violate the Enabling Act.235  Even if C.P.L.R. 901(b) had established a 
substantive right to be free from class liability, Scalia argued that Rule 23 
could displace it and still fall within the Enabling Act’s authorization 
because it really regulates procedure.236
B.  Justice Stevens’s Opinion 
 
Like Scalia, Justice Stevens began his analysis by determining whether 
Rule 23 and C.P.L.R. 901(b) conflict.237  Although he joined the plurality’s 
analysis of this issue, he also articulated a new two-step approach to 
interpreting the Federal Rules’ scope.238  First, a federal court would 
determine if it is possible to avoid a conflict “‘when [the Rule is] fairly 
construed,’ with ‘sensitivity to important state interests.’”239  Although 
Stevens agreed with the dissent that the Court should continue to interpret 
the Rules with sensitivity,240 he did not agree that this command requires 
the Court to interpret the Rules to avoid any Erie problem or “rewrite the 
rule[s].”241  Instead, it meant only that the federal courts should avoid 
interpretations that create “‘significant disuniformity between state and 
federal courts . . . if the text permits’” the court to do so.242
If this first step results in a conflict, in the second step, federal courts 
should determine whether applying the Federal Rule would “‘abridge, 
enlarge or modify any substantive right.’”
 
243
 
 233. Id. at 1443; see Mullenix, supra note 
  Justice Stevens argued that 
Congress had not “prescribe[d] procedural rules that [may] interfere with 
205, at 473. 
 234. Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1443. 
 235. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Miss. Publ’g Corp. v. Murphree, 326 U.S. 438, 
445 (1946)). 
 236. Id. at 1444. 
 237. Id. at 1450–51 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
 238. Id. at 1450 (advising federal courts to interpret “what the state law and the federal 
rule mean” at “both steps of the [Enabling Act] inquiry”); see id. at 1451–52 (explaining this 
process). 
 239. Id. at 1451 (quoting Burlington N. R.R. Co. v. Woods, 480 U.S. 1, 4 (1987); 
Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415, 427 n.7 (1996)).  Justice Stevens 
created strange bedfellows by supporting this single proposition with quotes from both 
Burlington Northern and Gasperini. Cf. supra note 156 and accompanying text (noting that 
Gasperini’s approach to interpreting the Federal Rules contradicted and apparently ignored 
Burlington Northern’s). 
 240. Id. at 1451 n.5. 
 241. Id. at 1456–57. 
 242. Id. at 1451 n.5 (quoting Stewart Org., Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 487 U.S. 22, 37–38 
(1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting)). 
 243. Id. at 1451 (quoting Rules Enabling Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b) (2006)). 
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state substantive law in any number of respects.”244  The Enabling Act 
prohibits the Rules from affecting “‘any substantive right.’”245  Thus, 
federal courts must analyze the Federal Rule’s “application” to the state 
law:  if a Federal Rule would “effectively” alter a substantive right when 
applied, it would violate the Enabling Act’s authorization.246  In that 
situation, the second step “bleed[s] back into the first” and Stevens would 
require the court to try to craft a “‘saving’ construction” of the Rule that 
would not violate the Enabling Act.247  If such a construction is not 
possible, “federal courts cannot apply the rule.”248  In support of this 
proposition, Stevens cited, as a comparison, a statement by former Justices 
Hugo Black and William O. Douglas that suggested that the Rules “‘as 
applied in given situations might have to be declared invalid.’”249  Aside 
from this comparison, Justice Stevens never indicated that courts should 
invalidate the Rules as applied, but instead instructed them to determine 
which law applied under Erie.250
Under Stevens’s construction, a Rule would violate the Enabling Act, 
even if it “displace[s] a state law that is procedural in the ordinary use of the 
term but is so intertwined with a state right or remedy that it functions to 
define the scope of the state-created right.”
 
251  Because “‘any rule can be 
said to have . . . substantive effects,’” Stevens would establish a high bar for 
finding an Enabling Act violation,252 such that a Rule that is “facially 
valid” under Justice Scalia’s test would only rarely violate Justice Stevens’s 
own test.253  For Stevens, the “mere possibility” that a Federal Rule affects 
a state right as applied is insufficient to find a violation; the federal court 
must have “little doubt.”254
 
 244. Id. at 1449. 
  Courts should presume that state laws designed 
as procedural rules only “reflect[] a judgment about how state courts ought 
 245. Id. at 1451 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2072). 
 246. Id. 
 247. Id. at 1452. 
 248. Id. 
 249. Id. (quoting Statement of Mr. Justice Black and Mr. Justice Douglas, 374 U.S. 865, 
870 (1963) [hereinafter Black & Douglas Statement]).  Justices Black and Douglas 
expressed that opinion in a statement urging Congress to amend the Enabling Act and 
remove the Supreme Court’s rulemaking authority so that it could avoid the potential 
embarrassment of invalidating rules it had approved. See Black & Douglas Statement, supra, 
at 869–70. 
 250. Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1452 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
 251. Id.; see Mullenix, supra note 205, at 474–75 (“Justice Stevens’ major point of 
departure from Justice Scalia’s analysis, then, is his observation that, under the Rules 
Enabling Act, not every rule of federal practice and procedure displaces state law.”); cf. 
Freer & Arthur, supra note 152, at 75 (“Justice Stevens is the first justice ever to engage in 
assessing whether state procedural rules—or rules of ‘form and mode’—are ‘bound up’ with 
the state’s definition of rights and obligations.”). 
 252. Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1457 (Stevens, J., concurring) (quoting Ely, supra note 1, 
at 724 n.170) (internal quotation marks omitted); see Thomas D. Rowe, Jr., Sonia, What’s a 
Nice Person like You Doing in Company like That?, 44 CREIGHTON L. REV. 107, 112 (2010). 
 253. Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1454 n.10 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
 254. Id. at 1457. 
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to operate”255 and should not give any weight to factors relevant to the Erie 
analysis, such as the tendency to promote forum shopping.256
Justice Stevens decided that C.P.L.R. 901(b) was not such a procedural 
rule intertwined with a substantive right.
 
257  Because 901(b) applies to all 
claims brought in a New York state court, not just claims created by New 
York law, it cannot define the scope of a state-created right.258  According 
to Justice Stevens, the legislative history “reveal[ed] a classically 
procedural calibration” of how easily class action claims could be litigated 
in New York courts.259  Even if there was a “plausible competing 
narrative[]” that the rule is also substantive, Justice Stevens would still 
apply Rule 23 because “there must be more than just a possibility” that the 
law was substantive.260
C.  The Holding of a Fragmented Court 
 
According to the doctrine announced in Marks v. United States,261 
“[w]hen a fragmented Court decides a case and no single rationale 
explaining the result enjoys the assent of five Justices, ‘the holding of the 
Court may be viewed as that position taken by those Members who 
concurred in the judgments on the narrowest grounds.’”262  The Supreme 
Court has noted, however, that this doctrine “‘is more easily stated than 
applied.’”263  Determining the narrowest opinion in Shady Grove is 
especially difficult because the Court’s prior decisions had obeyed the de 
facto rule that the Federal Rules could apply only if Erie did not require the 
application of state law, and Shady Grove broke that rule.264
According to Justice Scalia, the Enabling Act requires federal courts to 
consider only the nature of the Federal Rule, not the state law.
  This section 
compares Justice Scalia’s and Justice Stevens’s opinions to the cases 
examined in Part I to determine how far each approach departs from the 
Court’s precedent. 
265
 
 255. Id. 
  So long 
as the Rule really regulates procedure, it is valid and preempts the state law, 
 256. See id. at 1459. 
 257. See id. at 1457, 1459–60; Mullenix, supra note 205, at 476. 
 258. Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1457 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
 259. Id. at 1459. 
 260. Id. at 1459–60. 
 261. 430 U.S. 188 (1977). 
 262. Id. at 193 (alteration in original) (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 169 n.15 
(1976) (opinion of Stewart, Powell, & Stevens, JJ.)). 
 263. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 325 (2003) (quoting Nichols v. United States, 
511 U.S. 738, 745–46 (1994)) (recognizing the difficulty lower courts had in discerning the 
holding of Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978), and choosing to follow 
Justice Powell’s opinion without engaging in the Marks analysis). 
 264. See supra notes 90–99, 120, 124–30, 155–58, 167–72 and accompanying text 
(noting instances in which the Court did not apply a Federal Rule, or interpreted it narrowly, 
where Erie required state law to apply); supra notes 192–93, 203 and accompanying text 
(explaining that Shady Grove applied a Federal Rule even though its application would 
violate Erie). 
 265. See Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1442 (plurality opinion). 
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regardless of any incidental effect on substantive rights.266  This test was 
adapted from Sibbach and Hanna, and is similar to the Court’s controlling 
precedent in Burlington Northern.267  In both Sibbach and Hanna, however, 
the Court had determined that the state law was not substantive, and thus 
Erie did not require the Court to apply it.268  Although Burlington Northern 
never addressed the substantive nature of the state law, the opinion 
suggested that the state law was only procedural.269  Justice Scalia’s test 
departs from this precedent by authorizing a Federal Rule to violate Erie’s 
ban on forum shopping.270  His insistence that the test would authorize the 
preemption of a state law, no matter how substantive that law is, departs 
even further from precedent.271
Justice Stevens’s test, on the other hand, focuses on the substantive 
nature of the state law.
 
272  Under his interpretation of the Enabling Act, 
federal courts cannot preempt state substantive laws, or state procedural 
laws “so intertwined” with substantive rights that they define the scope of 
those rights.273  If the Federal Rule conflicts with this type of state law, 
federal courts must attempt a “‘saving’ construction” of the Rule.274  This 
approach is similar to those utilized in Walker, Gasperini, and Semtek, 
which interpreted the Rules narrowly to avoid conflicts with state laws that 
were substantive.275  On that point, Justice Stevens’s approach differs only 
because Erie considerations are irrelevant to his analysis.276  His opinion 
abandons the Court’s precedent, however, when it argues that the federal 
courts cannot apply Federal Rules that would affect substantive rights as 
applied to a particular state law and are incapable of a saving 
construction.277  Although the Court has interpreted certain Rules to avoid 
exceeding the Enabling Act’s authorization,278
 
 266. See id. at 1442–43. 
 it has never invalidated a 
 267. See Burlington N. R.R. Co. v. Woods, 480 U.S. 1, 5 (1987); Hanna v. Plumer, 380 
U.S. 460, 464–65 (1965); Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1, 14 (1941); Bassett, supra 
note 223, at 19–24 (arguing that the plurality test is consistent with Sibbach, Hanna, and 
Burlington Northern). 
 268. See Hanna, 380 U.S. at 469–70; Sibbach, 312 U.S. at 10–11, 13–14 (explaining that 
“if the right . . . [was] one of substantive law, the Rules of Decision Act required the District 
Court . . . to apply the [state] law,” but holding that the right was not substantive). 
 269. See supra note 140. 
 270. Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1447–48; cf. Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 468 (1965) 
(stating that one of the “twin aims of the Erie rule” is the “discouragement of forum-
shopping”). 
 271. Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1444–46 & nn.10 & 13 (plurality opinion). 
 272. See id. at 1449 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
 273. Id. at 1452. 
 274. Id. 
 275. See Semtek Int’l Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 531 U.S. 497, 508–09 (2001); 
Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415, 427 n.7 (1996); Walker v. Armco Steel 
Corp., 446 U.S. 740, 750–52 (1980); see also Ragan v. Merchs. Transfer & Warehouse Co., 
337 U.S. 530, 533–34 (1949) (reasoning that applying the Federal Rule would violate Erie). 
 276. See Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1459 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
 277. Id. at 1452. 
 278. See, e.g., Semtek, 531 U.S. at 503–04. 
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Federal Rule for exceeding that authorization.279
III.  ERIE ESCAPES FROM SHADY GROVE 
  Therefore, Shady Grove 
presents the lower courts with a difficult choice between two precedent-
breaking tests. 
Although the Shady Grove Court finally applied a Federal Rule where 
Erie would have required state law, the split opinions leave it unclear when 
other federal courts may do the same.  In fact, federal courts even disagree 
over whether Shady Grove permits them to certify class actions under 
Federal Rule 23 when a particular state law prohibits class recovery.  This 
part illustrates the lower courts’ confusion by examining their divergent 
decisions in situations that are most similar to those presented in Shady 
Grove.280
First, Part III.A explores the split between the Second and Third Circuits 
over the one issue that Shady Grove should have resolved:  whether federal 
courts can certify a class action where N.Y. C.P.L.R. 901(b) prohibits class 
recovery.  Next, Part III.B analyzes those decisions that follow Justice 
Scalia’s reasoning and certify class actions even though state law prohibits 
class recovery.  Finally, Part III.C examines those decisions that follow 
Justice Stevens’s approach and refuse to certify the class action because the 
state laws are intertwined with substantive rights. 
 
A.  The TCPA Split:  Holster and Landsman & Funk 
In the best example of the federal courts’ confusion after Shady Grove, 
the Second and Third Circuits have split over whether federal courts can 
certify a class action brought under the federal Telephone Consumer 
Protection Act281
 
 279. See Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1442 (plurality opinion); 4 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra 
note 
 (TCPA) when only N.Y. C.P.L.R. 901(b) prohibits class 
33, § 1030, at 166–67 & n.9. 
 280. The federal courts have applied and interpreted Shady Grove in many other contexts. 
See, e.g., All Plaintiffs v. All Defendants, 645 F.3d 329, 332–35 (5th Cir. 2011) (mandatory 
distribution of unclaimed checks scheme and Federal Rule 23’s discretionary review of 
settlements); Scottsdale Ins. Co. v. Tolliver, 636 F.3d 1273, 1278 n.5, 1279–80 (10th Cir. 
2011) (competing offer of judgment rules); Garman ex rel. Garman v. Campbell Cnty. Sch. 
Dist. No. 1, 630 F.3d 977, 980, 983 (10th Cir. 2010) (competing pleading requirements); 
Godin v. Schencks, 629 F.3d 79, 81–82, 87–91 (1st Cir. 2010) (state “special motion” for 
petitioning activity and federal standards for dismissal and summary judgment); Goldberg v. 
Pac. Indem. Co., 627 F.3d 752, 754–55 (9th Cir. 2010) (competing offer of judgment rules); 
In re Katrina Canal Breaches Litig., 401 F. App’x 884, 887 (5th Cir. 2010) (per curiam) 
(competing interpretations of class certification requirements); Hogan v. Novartis Pharms. 
Co., No. 06 Civ. 0260, 2011 WL 1336566, at *2–3 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 6, 2011) (competing 
rules of evidence); Willever v. United States, 775 F. Supp. 2d 771, 777–778 (D. Md. 2011) 
(competing expert report and default judgment rules); Estate of C.A. v. Grier, 752 F. Supp. 
2d 763, 766–68 (S.D. Tex. 2010) (competing expert report requirements); Lawler v. Miratek 
Corp., No. EP-09-CV-252-KC, 2010 WL 2838359, at *2 (W.D. Tex. July 16, 2010) 
(competing pleading standards).  Further analysis of these cases is beyond this Note’s scope. 
 281. 47 U.S.C. § 227 (2006). 
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recovery.282  The TCPA provides recipients of unsolicited, commercial 
faxes the right to recover a $500 statutory penalty for each transmission, “if 
otherwise permitted by the laws or rules of court of a State.”283  Although 
the TCPA is a federal statute, the Second and Third Circuits both have 
reasoned that Congress intended it to function as a state law.284  Thus, both 
Circuits have held that federal courts lack federal question jurisdiction over 
TCPA claims, but retain diversity jurisdiction over them as if they were 
state law claims.285
In Holster v. Gatco, Inc.,
 
286 the U.S. District Court for the Eastern 
District of New York dismissed a putative class action complaint seeking 
the TCPA’s $500 penalty because N.Y. C.P.L.R. 901(b) prohibits class 
recovery of statutory penalties.287  On appeal, the Second Circuit affirmed, 
reasoning that N.Y. C.P.L.R. 901(b) applied for two reasons:288  Erie 
required the district court to apply C.P.L.R. 901(b),289 and even if it did not, 
the TCPA incorporates C.P.L.R. 901(b) because a class action is not 
“‘otherwise permitted by the . . . rules of court of [New York].’”290
The Supreme Court granted certiorari in Holster, then vacated and 
remanded because Shady Grove abrogated the Second Circuit’s Erie 
holding.
 
291  In a concurring opinion to the Court’s order, Justice Scalia 
argued that Shady Grove probably abrogated the alternative holding as 
well.292  If the Second Circuit had interpreted the TCPA to require federal 
courts “to apply all state procedural rules that would effectively bar suit,” 
then Justice Scalia admitted there would be no conflict between the TCPA 
and Rule 23 because the TCPA would not provide a class remedy.293  
Justice Scalia believed such an interpretation was implausible, however, 
because it would function as a “partial repeal” of the Enabling Act and 
require federal courts to apply every minor or technical court rule that might 
bar suit.294  Instead, he would interpret the TCPA as authorizing a plaintiff 
to “bring” a claim so long as state courts permit him to do so.295
 
 282. See Landsman & Funk P.C. v. Skinder-Strauss Assocs., 640 F.3d 72, 90–92 & n.27 
(3d Cir.), reh’g en banc granted, Nos. 09-3105, 09-3532, 09-3793, 2011 WL 1879624 (3d 
Cir. May 17, 2011); Holster v. Gatco, Inc., 618 F.3d 214, 217–18 (2d Cir. 2010). 
  Because 
Shady Grove clarified that C.P.L.R. 901(b) “does not prevent a plaintiff 
from bringing ‘an action’ . . . but only from ‘maintain[ing]’ such a suit ‘as a 
class action,’” New York law permits plaintiffs to bring individual TCPA 
 283. 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3). 
 284. See Landsman & Funk, 640 F.3d at 76; Gottlieb v. Carnival Corp., 436 F.3d 335, 
342 (2d Cir. 2006). 
 285. See Landsman & Funk, 640 F.3d at 77–78, 89–90; Gottlieb, 436 F.3d at 342. 
 286. 618 F.3d 214 (2d Cir. 2010). 
 287. Id. at 215–16. 
 288. Id. (citing Bonime v. Avaya, Inc., 547 F.3d 497 (2d Cir. 2008)). 
 289. Id. 
 290. Id. at 215–16 (quoting 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3) (2006)). 
 291. Holster v. Gatco, Inc., 130 S. Ct. 1575, 1575 (2010) (mem.); see id. (Scalia, J., 
concurring). 
 292. See id. at 1575 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
 293. Id. at 1575–76. 
 294. Id. 
 295. Id. at 1576. 
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claims in federal court and Shady Grove authorized federal courts to join 
those claims in a class action.296
On remand, the Second Circuit rejected Justice Scalia’s arguments and 
affirmed its earlier decision.
 
297  It noted that Shady Grove had no effect on 
its TCPA interpretation and that “nothing prevent[ed] [the court] from 
saying that Congress intended some, but not necessarily all, state ‘rules of 
court’” to apply.298  Congress intended to give states some control over the 
TCPA remedy, it reasoned, and “[t]he ability to define when a class cause 
of action lies and when it does not is part of that control.”299  Thus, it held 
that the TCPA incorporates C.P.L.R. 901(b) as a measure of the substantive 
right to recover and refused to certify a class under Shady Grove where the 
relevant substantive law does not authorize class recovery.300
In contrast, a Third Circuit panel decided in Landsman & Funk P.C. v. 
Skinder-Strauss Associates
 
301 that federal courts can certify TCPA class 
actions, even if N.Y. C.P.L.R. 901(b) otherwise applies.302  A majority of 
the panel believed the fact that the TCPA is a federal statute—not a state 
law—was determinative.303  Even if that was insufficient reason to apply 
Rule 23, the majority alternatively held that, “under Shady Grove 
Orthopedic Associates, P.A. v. Allstate Insurance Co., federal law regarding 
class actions would be applied in federal courts.”304  It refused to interpret 
the “if otherwise permitted” language as “carv[ing] out TCPA claims from 
Rule 23’s ambit.”305  Following the Shady Grove plurality, it held that Rule 
23 “‘is authorized by [the Enabling Act] and is valid in all jurisdictions, 
with respect to all claims, regardless of its incidental effect upon state-
created rights.’”306  The dissenting judge did not address the Shady Grove 
issue because he disagreed with the majority’s decision that federal courts 
could exercise diversity jurisdiction over TCPA claims, and therefore 
believed the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the case.307  After 
creating a split with the Second Circuit, the Third Circuit has decided to 
rehear the case en banc.308
 
 296. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate 
Ins. Co., 130 S. Ct. 1431, 1443 (2010) (plurality opinion)). 
 
 297. Holster v. Gatco, Inc., 618 F.3d 214, 217–18 (2d Cir. 2010). 
 298. Id. at 217. 
 299. Id. at 218. 
 300. See id. 
 301. 640 F.3d 72 (3d Cir.), reh’g en banc granted, Nos. 09-3105, 09-3532, 09-3793, 2011 
WL 1879624 (3d Cir. May 17, 2011). 
 302. Id. at 90–92 & n.27 (citing 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3) (2006)). 
 303. Id. at 91. 
 304. Id. (internal citation omitted) (citing Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v. 
Allstate Ins. Co., 130 S. Ct. 1431 (2010)). 
 305. Id. at 91 n.27 (citing Holster v. Gatco, Inc., 130 S. Ct. 1575, 1575–76 (2010) (Scalia, 
J., concurring)). 
 306. Id. (quoting Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1444 (plurality opinion)). 
 307. Id. at 108 (Garth, J., dissenting). 
 308. Landsman & Funk PC v. Skinder-Strauss Assocs., Nos. 09-3105, 09-3532, 09-3793, 
2011 WL 1879624 (3d Cir. May 17, 2011).  The rehearing likely will focus on whether the 
court has subject matter jurisdiction over TCPA claims—not the Shady Grove issue—
because that was the primary issue before the court. See Landsman & Funk, 640 F.3d at 74 
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B.  Courts Following Justice Scalia 
Like the Third Circuit, two courts have followed the Shady Grove 
plurality’s reasoning and certified class actions where state law prohibits 
class recovery.  Neither case, however, explicitly engaged in the Marks 
analysis and determined that the plurality decided the case on the narrowest 
grounds.  This section analyzes those opinions. 
In American Copper & Brass, Inc. v. Lake City Industrial Products, 
Inc.,309 the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Michigan also 
confronted a TCPA class action complaint.310  American Copper & Brass 
had sued Lake City for a “blast fax advertisement” sent to 11,000 
individuals, seeking the TCPA’s $500 statutory penalty on behalf of each 
recipient.311  Lake City moved to dismiss because Michigan Court Rule 
3.501 prohibits plaintiffs from maintaining their claims as a class action so 
long as they seek a statutory penalty.312  Noting the similarity between 
Michigan Court Rule 3.501 and the procedural rule at issue in Shady Grove, 
the District Court denied the defendant’s motion.313  Citing the plurality 
opinion, the court reasoned that Shady Grove “held” that Rule 23 is 
procedural and therefore “‘valid in all jurisdictions, with respect to all 
claims, regardless of its incidental effect upon state-created rights.’”314  
Applying this test, the court held that it can certify a class seeking the 
TCPA’s statutory penalty, even if state court rules do not allow it.315
In In re OnStar Contract Litigation,
 
316 the U.S. District Court for the 
Eastern District of Michigan also appeared to follow the plurality’s test.317  
There, plaintiffs brought a class action under the Michigan Consumer 
Protection Act318 (MCPA) against four car manufacturers and the OnStar 
Corporation for fraudulently representing that their navigation systems 
would function for the duration of the vehicles’ lives.319
 
(“[A] common question arises in our review of each of the [three] cases [on appeal]:  
whether . . . federal courts can exercise diversity jurisdiction over private suits brought under 
the TCPA.”). 
  The MCPA, 
 309. No. 1:09-CV-1162, 2010 WL 2998472 (W.D. Mich. July 28, 2010). 
 310. Id. at *3. 
 311. Id. at *1. 
 312. See id. at *1–2. 
 313. Id. at *3; cf. N.Y. C.P.L.R. 901(b) (McKinney 2006); Shady Grove Orthopedic 
Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 130 S. Ct. 1431, 1436 (2010) (plurality opinion). 
 314. Am. Copper, 2010 WL 2998472, at *3 (quoting Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1444 
(plurality opinion)); cf. Landsman & Funk P.C. v. Skinder-Strauss Assocs., 640 F.3d 72, 91 
n.27 (3d Cir. 2011) (quoting Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1444 (plurality opinion)).  The 
American Copper court did not explain why the plurality’s opinion serves as Shady Grove’s 
holding.  In fact, it never indicated in its citation that this quoted text only came from a 
plurality opinion. See Am. Copper, 2010 WL 2998472, at *3. 
 315. Am. Copper, 2010 WL 2998472, at *3.  The court did not consider whether the 
TCPA’s “if otherwise permitted” language incorporates the state court rule, as the Second 
and Third Circuits had. See Landsman & Funk, 640 F.3d at 90–92 & n.27; Holster v. Gatco, 
Inc., 618 F.3d 214, 217–18 (2d Cir. 2010). 
 316. No. 2:07-MDL-01867, 2010 WL 3516691 (E.D. Mich. Aug. 25, 2010). 
 317. Id. at *4. 
 318. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 445.901–.922 (West 2010). 
 319. In re OnStar, 2010 WL 3516691, at *1–3. 
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however, only provides for “a class action on behalf of persons residing or 
injured in this state,”320 and the plaintiffs were non-residents.321  After 
reviewing Shady Grove, the court decided that Federal Rule 23 and the 
MCPA conflict, but certified the class of non-residents anyway.322  The 
court provided no further insight into its analysis.323  Because courts that 
follow Justice Stevens have held that Rule 23 cannot preempt similar state 
statutes without violating the Enabling Act,324 the In re OnStar court 
probably relied on the plurality’s opinion that Rule 23 is “valid in all 
jurisdictions, with respect to all claims,” as the Landsman & Funk and 
American Copper courts had.325
C.  Courts Following Justice Stevens 
 
Most courts that perform the Marks analysis determine that Justice 
Stevens’s opinion decided Shady Grove on the narrowest grounds.326
In In re Whirlpool Corp. Front-Loading Washer Products Liability 
Litigation,
  
Although Justice Stevens carefully articulated a two-step process for 
interpreting the Federal Rules to avoid conflict, these courts primarily rely 
on his “so intertwined” language to decide that the state law preempts 
Federal Rule 23.  This section examines these opinions. 
327 plaintiffs brought a class action under Section 1345.09(B) of 
the Ohio Consumer Sales Practice Act (OCSPA), alleging that Whirlpool 
knowingly sold defective machines.328  Under section 1345.09(B), if a 
business engages in any unfair or deceptive trade practice after receiving 
formal notice that the practice is illegal, victims can recover statutory 
damages of $200, “but not in a class action.”329  A class action may recover 
only actual damages.330  The plaintiffs argued, however, that Shady Grove 
permitted federal courts to certify a class seeking statutory damages under 
section 1345.09(B).331
After determining that section 1345.09(B) and Rule 23 conflict, but 
without articulating its analysis, the U.S. District Court for the Northern 
District of Ohio examined Rule 23’s validity under both the plurality’s and 
 
 
 320. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 445.911(3); see In re OnStar, 2010 WL 3516691, at *1. 
 321. See In re OnStar, 2010 WL 3516691, at *1–3. 
 322. Id. at *4. 
 323. See id. 
 324. See generally infra Part III.C. 
 325. Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 130 S. Ct. 1431, 1444 
(2010) (plurality opinion); cf. supra note 314 and accompanying text (noting American 
Copper and Landsman & Funk’s reliance on this part of the plurality opinion). 
 326. In addition to the cases discussed in this Part, see also Garman ex rel. Garman v. 
Campbell Cnty. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 630 F.3d 977, 983 n.6 (10th Cir. 2010); Godin v. Schencks, 
629 F.3d 79, 87, 89 (1st Cir. 2010); Estate of C.A. v. Grier, 752 F. Supp. 2d 763, 767 (S.D. 
Tex. 2010). 
 327. No. 1:08-WP-65000, 2010 WL 2756947 (N.D. Ohio July 12, 2010). 
 328. Id. at *1 (citing Ohio Consumer Sales Practice Act, OHIO REV. CODE ANN. 
§ 1345.09(B) (LexisNexis 2006)). 
 329. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1345.09(B). 
 330. See id. 
 331. See In re Whirlpool, 2010 WL 2756947, at *1. 
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Justice Stevens’s tests.332  It decided that Rule 23 is valid under the 
plurality’s test because it really regulates procedure, but invalid under 
Justice Stevens’s test because section 1345.09(B) “purports to define 
Ohio’s substantive rights and remedies by creating a cause of action” and 
therefore is “intimately interwoven with the substantive remedies 
available.”333  Unlike N.Y. C.P.L.R. 901(b) in Shady Grove, section 
1345.09(B) governs only a single Ohio state claim and does not apply to 
claims arising under other law.334  Because Rule 23 would alter this 
substantive Ohio right, the Rule is “ultra vires under the Rules Enabling 
Act, and must give way to [the state law].”335
The U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee faced a 
similar conflict in Bearden v. Honeywell International, Inc.
 
336  James and 
Sheila Bearden filed a class action under the Tennessee Consumer 
Protection Act,337 alleging that Honeywell misrepresented how much ozone 
its electronic air cleaners produced and that the excess ozone had injured 
Mrs. Bearden.338  Section 47-18-109(a)(1) of the Tennessee statute 
authorizes victims of an unfair trade practice to “‘bring an action 
individually to recover actual damages,’”339 which Tennessee courts 
interpret as prohibiting class recovery.340  Following In re Whirlpool,341 the 
district court held that Justice Stevens’s opinion decided Shady Grove on 
the narrowest grounds and is the effective holding.342  According to the 
court, Rule 23 could not apply because section 47-18-109(a)(1), unlike the 
procedural rule in Shady Grove, is part of the substantive statute and “so 
intertwined with that statute’s rights and remedies that it functions to define 
the scope of the substantive rights.”343
Another court in the Northern District of Ohio addressed Shady Grove in 
McKinney v. Bayer Corp.
 
344
 
 332. Id. at *2. 
  Like the plaintiffs in In re Whirlpool, George 
McKinney had filed a class action under the OCSPA, alleging that Bayer 
falsely advertised that its multivitamin reduced the risk of prostate cancer, 
 333. Id. (citing Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 130 S. Ct. 
1431, 1456 (2010) (Stevens, J., concurring)). 
 334. Id. (citing Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1457 (Stevens, J., concurring) (reasoning that 
C.P.L.R. 901(b) applies to all claims brought in New York courts)). 
 335. Id. (internal citations omitted) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b) (2006); OHIO REV. CODE 
ANN. § 1345.09(B) (LexisNexis 2006)). 
 336. No. 3:09-1035, 2010 WL 3239285, at *10 (M.D. Tenn. Aug. 16, 2010). 
 337. TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 47-18-101 to -130 (2001). 
 338. Bearden, 2010 WL 3239285, at *1–2. 
 339. Id. at *8 (quoting TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-18-109(a)(1)). 
 340. See id. (citing Walker v. Sunrise Pontiac-GMC Truck, Inc., 249 S.W.3d 301, 308–11 
(Tenn. 2008)). 
 341. See id. at *10 & n.8 (citing In re Whirlpool Corp. Front-Loading Washer Prods. 
Liab. Litig., No. 1:08-WP-65000, 2010 WL 2756947, at *6–7 (N.D. Ohio July 12, 2010)). 
 342. Id. at *10 (citing Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977); United States v. 
Cundiff, 555 F.3d 200, 208 (6th Cir. 2009)). 
 343. Id.; cf. N.Y. C.P.L.R. 901(b) (McKinney 2006); Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., 
P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 130 S. Ct. 1431, 1457 (2010) (Stevens, J., concurring). 
 344. 744 F. Supp. 2d 733, 743–44 (N.D. Ohio 2010). 
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even though it contained an ingredient that could increase that risk.345  
McKinney only sought actual damages under section 1345.09(A), however, 
and not statutory damages under section 1345.09(B).346  Subsection (A) 
authorizes victims of deceptive trade practices to recover actual damages 
“in an individual action” even where the defendant had no notice that the 
practices were illegal,347 but Ohio courts interpret the OCSPA as 
authorizing class recovery only under subsection (B), which requires prior 
notice.348  Agreeing with In re Whirlpool and Bearden,349 the district court 
decided that Justice Stevens’s opinion is the narrowest approach because it 
permits “some state law provisions addressing class actions” to apply, 
which the plurality test does not.350  Following In re Whirlpool, the court 
decided that OCSPA’s class action restrictions are substantive and thus 
Rule 23 “is ultra vires under the Rules Enabling Act” because it cannot 
apply without affecting Ohio’s substantive rights.351
The U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania followed 
all three of these district courts in In re Wellbutrin XL Antitrust 
Litigation.
 
352  After Shady Grove, the class action plaintiffs moved to add 
two state law antitrust claims to their complaint against Wellbutrin XL’s 
manufacturers, even though state law prohibits class recovery for both 
claims.353
 
 345. Id. at 738–39. 
  The district court decided that Justice Stevens’s opinion serves 
as Shady Grove’s holding because Stevens and the four dissenting Justices 
 346. Id. at 747. 
 347. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1345.09(A) (LexisNexis 2006). 
 348. McKinney, 744 F. Supp. 2d at 748 (citing Bower v. IBM, Inc., 495 F. Supp. 2d 837, 
840 (S.D. Ohio 2007)). 
 349. Id. at 747; see also Kline v. Mortg. Elec. Sec. Sys., No. 3:08CV408, 2010 WL 
6298271, at *3 (S.D. Ohio Dec. 30, 2010) (following Whirlpool, Bearden, and McKinney).  
In Kline, the court was also persuaded by the fact that the Sixth Circuit had quoted Justice 
Stevens’s opinion with approval. See Kline, 2010 WL 6298271, at *3 n.4 (quoting Beal ex 
rel. Putnam v. Walgreen Co., 408 F. App’x 898, 901 n.2 (6th Cir. 2010) (quoting Shady 
Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 130 S. Ct. 1431, 1448 (2010) (Stevens, 
J., concurring))).  In a footnote in Beal, the Sixth Circuit relied on Shady Grove in rejecting 
the plaintiffs’ argument that the district court should decide its summary judgment motion 
under Tennessee’s interpretation of its summary judgment rule, instead of the Sixth Circuit’s 
interpretation of the identical Federal Rule. Beal, 408 F. App’x at 901 n.2.  Although the 
Sixth Circuit quoted exclusively from Justice Stevens’s opinion, the quoted language was 
not related to the split between Justices Scalia and Stevens and the Sixth Circuit did not 
decide that issue. See id. 
 350. McKinney, 744 F. Supp. 2d at 747. 
 351. Id. at 749 (citing In re Whirlpool Corp. Front-Loading Washer Prods. Liab. Litig., 
No. 1:08-WP-65000, 2010 WL 2756947, at *2–3 (N.D. Ohio July 12, 2010)). 
 352. 756 F. Supp. 2d 670, 675 (E.D. Pa. 2010) (citing McKinney, 744 F. Supp. 2d at 746–
47; Bearden v. Honeywell Int’l, Inc., No. 3:09-1035, 2010 WL 3239285, at *10 (M.D. Tenn. 
Aug. 16, 2010); In re Whirlpool, 2010 WL 2756947, at *1–3).  As courts search for guidance 
in interpreting Shady Grove, many courts simply follow In re Whirlpool, Bearden, and 
McKinney and conclude that Justice Stevens’s opinion serves as Shady Grove’s holding. See, 
e.g., In re Digital Music Antitrust Litig., No. 06 MD 1780, 2011 WL 2848195, at *18 
(S.D.N.Y. July 18, 2011); Tait v. BSH Home Appliances Corp., No. SACV 10-711 DOC, 
2011 WL 1832941, at *8–9 (C.D. Cal. May 12, 2011); In re Packaged Ice Antitrust Litig., 
No. 08-MD-01952, 2011 WL 891169, at *15 (E.D. Mich. Mar. 11, 2011); Kline, 2010 WL 
6298271, at *3. 
 353. In re Wellbutrin, 756 F. Supp. 2d at 672. 
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formed a majority “call[ing] for an analysis of the state’s substantive rights 
and remedies.”354  Therefore, the court closely analyzed the substantive 
nature of the two new claims based on the Illinois Antitrust Act355 and the 
New York Donnelly Act.356
The Illinois Antitrust Act provides that plaintiffs may sue for damages, 
but authorizes only the Attorney General to maintain a class action “‘in any 
court of this State.’”
 
357  The district court rejected the plaintiffs’ argument 
that this limiting language means that the class restriction only applies to 
actions brought in Illinois state courts, because the statute includes the same 
language in the private cause of action.358  If the private right of action is 
enforceable in other courts, the court reasoned, the class action restrictions 
are also enforceable.359  Citing McKinney, Bearden, and In re Whirlpool, 
the court distinguished these class restrictions from the procedural rule in 
Shady Grove360 because they apply only to the antitrust statute, appear 
within the same statutory provision as the substantive right, and serve the 
substantive purpose of precluding duplicative recoveries.361  Thus, the 
restrictions are “‘intertwined’ with the underlying substantive right,” and 
allowing the plaintiffs to add that claim to the class action “would ‘abridge, 
enlarge or modify’ Illinois’ substantive rights.”362  Under New York law, 
however, only N.Y. C.P.L.R. 901(b) prohibits class recovery.363  Because 
Shady Grove held that C.P.L.R. 901(b) does not define any of New York’s 
substantive rights,364 the court permitted the plaintiffs to add that claim.365
IV.  THE HIDDEN HOLDING 
 
Part III’s examination of the lower courts’ confusion reveals that a new 
episode in the Erie odyssey has begun.  Originally, Erie guided the federal 
courts’ choice between state substantive law and the Federal Rules.366  
After Hanna established an independent Enabling Act analysis, Erie 
transformed into a “sensitivity to important state interests.”367
 
 354. Id. at 675. 
  This 
sensitivity led the courts to interpret the Federal Rules narrowly to avoid 
 355. Id. at 676–77 (citing Illinois Antitrust Act, 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 10/1–12 
(West 2010)). 
 356. Id. at 677–80 (citing Donnelly Act, N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW § 340 (McKinney 2004)). 
 357. Id. at 676 (quoting 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 10/7(2)). 
 358. Id. 
 359. Id. 
 360. Id. at 677 (citing McKinney v. Bayer Corp., 744 F. Supp. 2d 733, 745–47 (N.D. 
Ohio 2010); Bearden v. Honeywell Int’l, Inc., No. 3:09-1035, 2010 WL 3239285, at *10 
(M.D. Tenn. Aug. 16, 2010); In re Whirlpool Corp. Front-Loading Washer Prods. Liab. 
Litig., No. 1:08-WP-65000, 2010 WL 2756947, at *1–3 (N.D. Ohio July 12, 2010)). 
 361. Id. 
 362. Id.; see also In re Digital Music Antitrust Litig., No. 06 MD 1780, 2011 WL 
2848195, at *17 (S.D.N.Y. July 18, 2011) (following In re Wellbutrin and dismissing Illinois 
antitrust claims). 
 363. See In re Wellbutrin, 756 F. Supp. 2d at 678. 
 364. Id. at 679. 
 365. Id. at 682. 
 366. See supra notes 95, 98–99 and accompanying text. 
 367. Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415, 427 n.7 (1996). 
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conflicts with those state laws that Erie required them to apply.368  Now, 
Erie has escaped from Shady Grove as the “so intertwined” test.369  Even 
though Justice Stevens considered procedural laws so intertwined with 
substantive rights to be rare,370 a significant number of federal courts have 
already found several of these intertwined laws to which the Federal Rules 
must give way.371
There is hope that this fate can be avoided.  Contrary to the prevailing 
wisdom among the lower federal courts, Justice Stevens’s opinion did not 
decide Shady Grove on the narrowest grounds.  Those courts determining 
that his opinion did so fail to realize that the “so intertwined” language was 
not necessary to decide the case because N.Y. C.P.L.R. 901(b) is not a 
procedural rule that defines the scope of any substantive rights.
  Erie has tricked the federal courts again. 
372  That so 
many courts have used this dictum as a tool to invalidate the Federal 
Rules,373 despite the Court’s consistent endorsements of their general 
validity,374 merely demonstrates how far that part of Justice Stevens’s 
opinion departs from precedent.375
Because Justice Scalia also opined on whether the Federal Rules can 
preempt these intertwined laws in Part II.C of the plurality opinion,
 
376 only 
one Justice “‘concurred in the judgments on the narrowest grounds’”377:  
Justice Sonia Sotomayor.  Although she joined the plurality and did not 
write a separate opinion, she expressed a narrower opinion than Justice 
Scalia by declining to join Part II.C.378
 
 368. See supra notes 
  If the federal courts follow the 
position that Justice Sotomayor took in these parts, it would resolve the 
lower courts’ split and finally prevent Erie from undermining the Rules’ 
173–91 and accompanying text. 
 369. See supra notes 333–35, 343, 351, 355–65 and accompanying text. 
 370. See Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 130 S. Ct. 1431, 
1455 n.13 (2010) (Stevens, J., concurring). 
 371. See supra notes 333–35, 343, 351, 355–65 and accompanying text. 
 372. See Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1457 (Stevens, J., concurring) (“It is therefore hard to 
see how § 901(b) could be understood as a rule that, though procedural in form, serves the 
function of defining New York’s rights or remedies.”); infra note 388 (noting that Justices 
Scalia and Stevens’s disagreement was dicta). 
 373. See supra notes 333–35, 351 and accompanying text. 
 374. See, e.g., Burlington N. R.R. Co. v. Woods, 480 U.S. 1, 6 (1987) (“Moreover, the 
study and approval given each proposed Rule by the Advisory Committee, the Judicial 
Conference, and this Court, and the statutory requirement that the Rule be reported to 
Congress for a period of review before taking effect, give the Rules presumptive validity 
under both the constitutional and statutory constraints.” (internal citation omitted) (citing 
Rules Enabling Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1982); Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 471 (1965))); 
Hanna, 380 U.S. at 471 (“[T]he court has been instructed to apply the Federal Rule, and can 
refuse to do so only if the Advisory Committee, this Court, and Congress erred in their prima 
facie judgment that the Rule in question transgresses neither the terms of the Enabling Act 
nor constitutional restrictions.”). 
 375. See supra notes 277–79 and accompanying text. 
 376. See Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1445 (plurality opinion); supra note 271 and 
accompanying text. 
 377. Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977) (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 
U.S. 153, 169 n.15 (1976) (opinion of Stewart, Powell, & Stevens, JJ.)). 
 378. See Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1436. 
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uniformity.  This part examines her “opinion” and argues that it should 
serve as the holding of Shady Grove. 
First, Part IV.A examines the parts of the plurality opinion that Justice 
Sotomayor joined for her hidden “opinion.”  Next, Part IV.B argues that 
this position is actually the narrowest departure from precedent.  Finally, 
Part IV.C demonstrates how Justice Sotomayor’s test would resolve the 
conflicts in Part III. 
A.  Justice Sotomayor’s Silent Opinion 
Although Justice Sotomayor joined most of the plurality opinion and 
endorsed the validity of Rules that “‘really regulat[e] procedure,’”379 she 
did not concur in Part II.C.380
In Part II.C, Justice Scalia insisted that the Enabling Act authorizes a 
Federal Rule to preempt even a state procedural rule “‘so bound up with,’ or 
‘sufficiently intertwined with,’ a substantive state-law right or remedy ‘that 
it defines [its] scope.’”
  In that portion, Justice Scalia articulated a 
broader interpretation of the Enabling Act’s authorization than he had in the 
parts that Justice Sotomayor joined.  This Section examines Justice 
Sotomayor’s narrower “opinion” as expressed in Parts II.A, B, and D. 
381  According to Justice Scalia, displacing “those 
‘rare’ state substantive laws that are disguised as rules of procedure” is the 
sort of “incidental effect[]” that the Enabling Act permits.382  This kind of 
effect, however, would be broader than those that Justice Sotomayor agreed 
are permissible.  In the other parts of the plurality opinion, “the sort[s] of 
‘incidental effec[t][s]’” identified as not violating the Enabling Act consist 
of only “practical effect[s] on the parties’ rights,” such as requiring litigants 
to submit to court-ordered physical examinations, imposing sanctions for 
court-related conduct, and increasing the likelihood that plaintiffs will 
actually bring their claims in a class action.383  In those instances, “none [of 
the Federal Rules] altered the rights themselves, the available remedies, or 
the rules of decision by which the court adjudicated either.”384  In contrast, 
Justice Scalia would allow a Federal Rule to “pre-empt a conflicting state 
rule, however ‘bound up’ [it] is with substantive law.”385
Justice Sotomayor did agree with the plurality that “the substantive 
nature of [the state] law, or its substantive purpose, makes no difference” in 
 
 
 379. Id. at 1442 (alteration in original) (quoting Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1, 14 
(1941)). 
 380. See id. at 1436. 
 381. Id. at 1444–45 (plurality opinion) (internal citations omitted) (quoting the 
concurrence); see also id. at 1446 n.13. 
 382. Id. at 1445 n.10 (emphasis omitted); see Burlington N. R.R. Co. v. Woods, 480 U.S. 
1, 5 (1987) (“Rules which incidentally affect litigants’ substantive rights do not violate [the 
Enabling Act’s] provision if [such effects are] reasonably necessary to maintain the integrity 
of that [uniform] system of rules.”); Miss. Publ’g Corp. v. Murphree, 326 U.S. 438, 445 
(1946) (deciding that the Enabling Act was “obviously not addressed to such incidental 
effects as necessarily attend the adoption of the [Federal Rules]”). 
 383. Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1442–43 (second alteration in original) (quoting Miss. 
Pub’g, 326 U.S. at 445). 
 384. Id. at 1443. 
 385. Id. at 1446 n.13. 
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determining whether a Federal Rule falls within the Enabling Act’s 
authorization, but she only agreed that such a standard was necessary to 
prevent a Rule’s validity from turning on whether it “frustrate[s]” the 
operation of a substantive law.386  She did not agree that the Enabling Act 
authorizes a Federal Rule to completely “pre-empt” either a substantive law 
or a procedural rule “‘bound-up’” with substantive rights, as Justice Scalia 
argued in Part II.C.387  Justice Sotomayor offered no formal opinion on the 
latter issue, and providing one was unnecessary because C.P.L.R. 901(b) is 
not this sort of “intertwined” procedural rule.388
Of course, Justice Sotomayor also did not support Justice Stevens’s 
opinion that Federal Rules that would displace these “intertwined” 
procedural rules are invalid as applied.
  Nevertheless, her decision 
not to join Justice Scalia in Part II.C suggests that she did not believe the 
Enabling Act’s authorization is that broad. 
389  Instead, she noted with the rest 
of the plurality that the Court has “rejected every statutory challenge to a 
Federal Rule that has come before [it].”390  In lieu of invalidating Rules that 
might violate the Enabling Act, she endorsed the Court’s approach in 
Semtek, where it “interpret[ed] [a Federal Rule] in a manner that avoid[ed] 
overstepping its authorizing statute” because “the Rule [was] susceptible of 
two meanings—one that would violate [the Enabling Act] and another that 
would not.”391  Because some commentators have suggested that there 
really was no ambiguity in the Federal Rule at issue in Semtek,392 it is 
highly unlikely that a Rule will ever prove incapable of such a saving 
construction, as even Justice Stevens admitted.393
Nevertheless, she offered no opinion on whether the Enabling Act 
authorizes a Rule’s validity in those rare instances where it is incapable of a 
saving construction.
  Therefore, Justice 
Sotomayor’s position is sufficient to resolve almost all conflicts between 
the Rules and “intertwined” state procedural laws. 
394
 
 386. Id. at 1444. 
  The parts she joined, however, suggest that in those 
very narrow circumstances, she probably would endorse the Rule’s validity 
under the Enabling Act, so long as the Rule is interpreted to “‘really 
regulate[] procedure,’” because she agreed that a uniform system of 
procedural rules requires an Enabling Act test that considers only “what the 
 387. Id. at 1446 n.13. 
 388. See Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1456 (Stevens, J., concurring) (noting that N.Y. 
C.P.L.R. 901(b) is not a substantive law disguised as a procedural rule).  As the issue was 
not before the Court, Justices Stevens and Scalia’s discussion of this topic was only dicta—
albeit “considered dict[a].” Ely, supra note 1, at 710 (referring to Hanna’s decision to 
address the alternative Erie analysis); cf. supra notes 121–30 and accompanying text 
(explaining how Hanna’s “considered dictum” allowed Erie to escape its holding). 
 389. See Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1452 (Stevens, J., concurring); supra notes 247–50 
and accompanying text. 
 390. Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1442 (plurality opinion). 
 391. Id. at 1441–42 (internal citation omitted) (citing Semtek Int’l, Inc. v. Lockheed 
Martin Corp., 531 U.S. 497, 503–04 (2001)). 
 392. See Dudley & Rutherglen, supra note 9, at 722–23. 
 393. See Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1454 n.10 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
 394. See id. at 1452. 
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rule itself regulates.”395  Declining to join Justice Scalia’s Part II.C suggests 
that her version of the test does not categorically authorize the Rules to 
preempt procedural laws so intertwined with substantive rights where 
saving constructions obviate the need to do so.  Yet, declining to join 
Justice Stevens’s opinion suggests that there might be instances in which 
the Enabling Act’s authorization must expand to allow the Rule to operate 
when it is “reasonably necessary to maintain the integrity of [the uniform] 
system of rules.”396  This interpretation of Justice Sotomayor’s vote would 
resolve her seemingly inconsistent views that the Court should “reject[] 
every statutory challenge to a Federal Rule that . . . come[s] before [it],”397 
but that the Enabling Act may not authorize every effect on a state’s 
substantive rights that can be called “incidental.”398
B.  The Narrowest Opinion 
  Thus, Justice 
Sotomayor’s “opinion” endorsed a middle ground that decided Shady Grove 
on the narrowest grounds. 
Justice Sotomayor’s approach, as described in Part IV.A, would combine 
the Court’s two competing strains of Enabling Act decisions.  Following the 
Walker, Gasperini, and Semtek line of cases, it would interpret the Rules 
narrowly where necessary to avoid overstepping the Enabling Act’s 
authorization.399  In keeping with the reasoning of Sibbach, Hanna, and 
Burlington Northern, however, it would interpret the Enabling Act broadly 
to promote the Rules’ uniformity.400
Before Shady Grove, Gasperini urged the federal courts to interpret the 
Rules with “sensitivity to important state interests.”
  This section explains how Justice 
Sotomayor’s approach would resolve this apparent conflict. 
401  In practice, this 
doctrine required the courts to avoid interpreting the Federal Rules in a way 
that would preempt the state laws that Erie required them to apply.402  
Although both the plurality and Justice Stevens rejected this practice,403 
many lower courts note that Justice Stevens and the four dissenting Justices 
formed a majority that would continue to consider the state law’s 
substantive aspects.404
 
 395. Id. at 1442, 1444 (plurality opinion) (“‘If we were to adopt the suggested criterion of 
the importance of the alleged right we should invite endless litigation and confusion worse 
confounded.  The test must be whether a rule really regulates procedure . . . .’” (quoting 
Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1, 13–14 (1941))). 
  Because the plurality believed that “the substantive 
 396. Burlington N. R.R. Co. v. Woods, 480 U.S. 1, 5 (1987). 
 397. Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1442 (plurality opinion). 
 398. Cf. id. at 1445 n.10 (arguing in Part C that preempting substantive laws “disguised” 
as procedural rules is a permissible incidental effect). 
 399. See supra note 275 and accompanying text. 
 400. See supra note 267 and accompanying text. 
 401. See supra note 177 and accompanying text. 
 402. See supra notes 178–79 and accompanying text. 
 403. See supra note 203 and accompanying text. 
 404. See, e.g., Godin v. Schencks, 629 F.3d 79, 87 (1st Cir. 2010); In re Digital Music 
Antitrust Litig., No. 06 MD 1780, 2011 WL 2848195, at *18 (S.D.N.Y. July 18, 2011); In re 
Wellbutrin XL Antitrust Litig., 756 F. Supp. 2d 670, 675 (E.D. Pa. 2010); Estate of C.A. v. 
Grier, 752 F. Supp. 2d 763, 767 (S.D. Tex. 2010). 
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nature of [the state] law, or its substantive purpose, makes no difference,”405 
those courts decided that Justice Stevens’s opinion struck a balance 
between the plurality and the dissent that resolved Shady Grove on the 
narrowest grounds.406
Although Justice Sotomayor agreed with the plurality on that point, she 
only agreed that the state law’s substantive nature makes no difference 
during the second step of the Enabling Act inquiry—determining whether 
the Enabling Act authorizes the Rule.
 
407  If she agreed with Justice Scalia 
that the substantive nature of the state law is never relevant, she probably 
would have joined Part II.C, which took this position.408  Gasperini and 
Semtek, however, had required a “sensitive” interpretation during the first 
step—determining whether the Federal Rule and the state law directly 
conflict with each other.409  Justice Sotomayor agreed that this first step 
requires federal courts to determine “whether [the state law] concerns a 
subject separate from the subject of [the Federal Rule],” which necessarily 
requires consideration of the state law’s subject.410  She also would allow 
the courts to interpret the Rules “in a manner that avoids overstepping 
[their] authorizing statute,” provided that “the Rule[s] were susceptible of 
two meanings—one that would violate [the Enabling Act] and another that 
would not.”411  Because she believed a valid Federal Rule could only be 
construed as “‘really regulat[ing] procedure,’”412 this ambiguity would exist 
only if the Rule appears to share the same subject as a state law that 
regulates substantive rights.  If they share the same subject in that instance, 
the Rule must also regulate substantive rights—or at least, it must not 
“really” regulate procedure.  In those circumstances, Justice Sotomayor 
indicated a federal court could interpret the Rules “‘with sensitivity.’”413
The parts that Justice Sotomayor joined cited Semtek as a proper example 
of this kind of interpretation,
 
414
 
 405. Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 130 S. Ct. 1431, 1444 
(2010) (plurality opinion). 
 and that decision serves as a good 
illustration of her approach to this first step.  Semtek decided that Federal 
Rule 41, which provides that certain dismissals are adjudications “‘upon the 
merits,’” does not govern whether such dismissals are entitled to preclusive 
 406. See supra note 404. 
 407. See Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1444 (plurality opinion); supra note 180 and 
accompanying text.  Because the dissent reasoned that Rule 23 and C.P.L.R. 901(b) do not 
conflict, it never proposed a test for determining the scope of the Enabling Act’s 
authorization. See Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1469 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 408. See Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1445–46 & n.13 (plurality opinion). 
 409. See supra notes 176–77 and accompanying text. 
 410. See Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1438–39; supra notes 211–19 and accompanying 
text. 
 411. Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1441 (plurality opinion). 
 412. Id. at 1442 (quoting Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1, 14 (1941)). 
 413. See id. at 1441–42 & n.7 (quoting dissent); cf. 4 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 30, § 
1030, at 166 & n.8 (“[I]t is clear that a rule will not be interpreted in a manner that will 
render it invalid as long as an interpretation that preserves the rule’s integrity is available to 
the court.”). 
 414. See Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1441–42 & n.7 (citing Semtek Int’l Inc. v. Lockheed 
Martin Corp., 531 U.S. 497, 503–04 (2001)). 
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effect.415  Thus, litigants may bring their dismissed claims in another state, 
and even in a federal court in a different state, so long as state law permits 
them to do so.416  The Court reached this conclusion because it believed the 
phrase “upon the merits” in Rule 41 is ambiguous and thus it avoided an 
interpretation that would violate the Enabling Act.417  Professors Earl C. 
Dudley and George Rutherglen have argued that the phrase is not 
ambiguous and Semtek is the only case that has ever construed it as not 
granting preclusive effect.418  In light of Justice Sotomayor’s opinion, 
however, the “ambiguity” in Semtek was not in the text of the Rule, but in 
what the Rule appeared to regulate.419  Rule 41 appeared to share the same 
subject as state laws that granted preclusive effect to judgments that were 
“upon the merits.”  Those types of state laws regulate the existence of a 
substantive right:  the plaintiff’s right to pursue a particular claim.  If Rule 
41 shares that subject, then it would regulate substantive rights in violation 
of the Enabling Act.420  Therefore, the Court found a way to plausibly 
construe the Rule as only regulating procedure.421
This method of interpretation maintains Gasperini and Semtek’s process 
of avoiding Enabling Act violations, but alters the focus.  Whereas 
Gasperini and Semtek considered whether the state law was substantive 
under Erie, Justice Sotomayor would ask whether the Federal Rule would 
regulate substantive rights if it preempts the state law.  If the Federal Rule 
appears to do so, then the court should limit the Rule’s function to 
regulating procedure.
 
422  This approach only narrowly departs from 
Gasperini and Semtek and is generally consistent with Justice Stevens’s 
approach.423
Justice Sotomayor only departs from Justice Stevens with respect to 
Rules that are incapable of saving constructions.
 
424
 
 415. Semtek, 531 U.S. at 505–06 (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 41(b)). 
  Unlike the plurality, 
Justice Stevens believed that the Enabling Act prohibits the Federal Rules 
from having “any” effect on substantive rights as applied—even if the 
Rules really regulate procedure—and thus prohibits the federal courts from 
 416. See id. at 508–09. 
 417. See id. at 503–04. 
 418. See Dudley & Rutherglen, supra note 9, at 722–23; supra notes 168–69; see also 
Whitten, supra note 167, at 120 (describing Semtek’s construction of the Federal Rule as a 
“clearly tortured interpretation”). 
 419. Compare Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1438–39 (plurality opinion) (“[T]he question 
before us is whether [the state law] concerns a subject separate from the subject of Rule 
23 . . . .”), with id. at 1441–42 (citing Semtek as an example of an ambiguous rule). 
 420. See id. at 1442. 
 421. See supra note 169 and accompanying text. 
 422. See supra notes 412–13 and accompanying text.  In a footnote, Justice Sotomayor 
joined the plurality’s argument against interpreting the Rules narrowly only “to avoid doubt 
as to [their] validity,” but there the plurality only meant that the Rules should not be 
interpreted to avoid Erie violations “since a Federal Rule that fails Erie’s forum-shopping 
test is not ipso facto invalid.” Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1441 n.7. 
 423. Cf. supra notes 238–47 and accompanying text (discussing Justice Stevens’s 
approach to construing the Federal Rules’ scope). 
 424. Cf. supra notes 248–50 and accompanying text (noting Justice Stevens’s preference 
not to apply such Rules). 
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applying a Rule incapable of a saving construction that avoids the improper 
effect.425  He instructed courts to engage instead in an Erie analysis to 
determine which law should apply under the Rules of Decision Act.426
The Supreme Court has never found that a Rule exceeded the Enabling 
Act’s authorization and thus it has never invalidated a Rule.
  
This approach is unprecedented and problematic. 
427  Although 
Justice Stevens only suggested that Rules may have to be invalidated as 
applied,428 this mere suggestion is problematic because a few lower courts 
actually have invalidated Rules under his approach.429  The effect of these 
courts’ decisions is unclear because the Supreme Court has never decided 
that a Federal Rule can be invalid only as applied.430  If the Enabling Act 
does not authorize the Federal Rules to have any effect on substantive 
rights, as Justice Stevens interpreted it,431 then a Rule may lack 
authorization in all instances if a court finds that it would affect even one 
substantive right as applied.  Those courts that decided that Federal Rule 23 
is “ultra vires” probably intended to invalidate it only as applied to the 
particular state law at issue,432
Even more troubling is that Justice Stevens left open the possibility that a 
court may apply an unauthorized Federal Rule so long as Erie does not 
require state law to apply.
 but their decisions may have invalidated 
Rule 23 generally throughout the country.  The mere possibility that there is 
no federal class action rule is obviously problematic. 
433  Semtek demonstrated that such situations 
could occur.434  There, the Court interpreted Federal Rule 41 narrowly so as 
not to violate the Enabling Act, but it also decided that state law did not 
apply because the preclusive effect of a federal judgment is a matter of 
federal law.435  In that situation, federal common law governs.436
 
 425. See Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1452 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
  In 
 426. See id.; cf. Godin v. Schencks, 629 F.3d 79, 86–87 (1st Cir. 2010) (noting that the 
court still must determine what law applies under Erie after determining that the Federal 
Rule cannot apply under Justice Stevens’s test). 
 427. See 4 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 33, § 1030, at 166–67 & n.9.  The Court has 
declined to apply a Rule, however, when its application would have violated Erie. See supra 
notes 95, 98–99 and accompanying text (discussing Ragan and Cohen).  In Hanna, the Court 
distinguished these decisions as instances in which the “the scope of the Federal Rule was 
not as broad as the losing party urged,” and not as instances in which the Rule was invalid. 
Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 470 (1965). 
 428. See supra notes 248–50 and accompanying text. 
 429. See supra notes 333–35, 351 and accompanying text. 
 430. Cf. Dudley & Rutherglen, supra note 9, at 748 (recommending general invalidation 
where a conflict is found, which would force the drafters to amend the Federal Rule). 
 431. Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1451 (Stevens, J., concurring); see Rules Enabling Act, 
28 U.S.C. § 2072(b) (2006); supra notes 244–51 and accompanying text. 
 432. See supra notes 333–35, 351 and accompanying text. 
 433. See supra notes 250, 425–26 and accompanying text; cf. Godin v. Schencks, 629 
F.3d 79, 86–87 (1st Cir. 2010) (suggesting that state law may not apply even if it does not 
conflict with a Federal Rule). 
 434. See Semtek Int’l, Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 531 U.S. 497, 506–08 (2001) 
(reasoning that federal common law can apply where there is no federal constitutional 
provision or statute on point). 
 435. See supra notes 170–71 and accompanying text. 
 436. See id. 
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Semtek, the court decided that federal common law requires that state 
preclusion law govern the effect of a federal judgment, but indicated that a 
different common law rule may be necessary in certain instances to protect 
federal interests.437  Semtek suggested that a federal common law rule can 
grant preclusive effect when state law would not, and thus may have the 
kind of substantive effect that the Federal Rules cannot under the Enabling 
Act.438  In his opinion in Shady Grove, Justice Stevens provided no further 
guidance on which rule to adopt in those types of situations.439
Such an outcome would violate Erie’s one clear holding:  that the federal 
courts have no constitutional power to announce rules affecting substantive 
rights.
  Thus, it is 
possible that a federal court following his approach can invalidate a Federal 
Rule as applied, but then decide to adopt that invalidated Rule as a federal 
common law rule, free of the Enabling Act’s restrictions. 
440  Only Congress has the constitutional power to regulate matters 
that are both arguably procedural and arguably substantive.441  Because 
Congress exercised that power in the Enabling Act to create a uniform 
system of Federal Rules, the “inevitable (indeed, one might say the 
intended)”442 inference is that the Enabling Act should authorize the Rules 
to apply in situations that are necessary to the existence of a uniform 
system, notwithstanding the limitation on affecting substantive rights.443  
This is exactly what a unanimous Court held in Burlington Northern, the 
controlling precedent on the scope of the Enabling Act’s authorization 
before Shady Grove.444
 
 437. See Semtek, 531 U.S. at 508–09. 
  There, the Court decided that the Act authorizes a 
Rule that could “reasonably be classified as procedural,” “affects only the 
process of enforcing litigants’ rights,” and only “incidentally affect[s]” 
substantive rights in a way that is “reasonably necessary to maintain the 
 438. See Patrick Woolley, The Sources of Federal Preclusion Law After Semtek, 72 U. 
CIN. L. REV. 527, 592–94 (2003) (analyzing the relationship between the Enabling Act and 
federal common law rules and noting that “Semtek raises questions . . . about whether 
federal common-law rules of preclusion can be developed to directly enforce valid Federal 
Rules”). 
 439. See Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1452 (Stevens, J., concurring) (“[W]hen such a 
‘saving’ construction is not possible and the rule would violate the Enabling Act, federal 
courts cannot apply the rule. . . . [A] federal court must engage in the traditional Rules of 
Decision Act inquiry, under the Erie line of cases.” (citations omitted)). 
 440. See Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78–80 (1938); supra notes 52–56 and 
accompanying text. 
 441. See Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 472 (1965) (“[T]he constitutional provision for 
a federal court system (augmented by the Necessary and Proper Clause) carries with it 
congressional power to . . . regulate matters which, though falling within the uncertain area 
between substance and procedure, are rationally capable of classification as either.”). 
 442. Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1447–48 (plurality opinion). 
 443. See Burlington N. R.R. Co. v. Woods, 480 U.S. 1, 5 (1986) (“The cardinal purpose 
of Congress in authorizing the development of a uniform and consistent system of rules 
governing federal practice and procedure suggests that Rules which incidentally affect 
litigants’ substantive rights do not violate [the Enabling Act] if reasonably necessary to 
maintain the integrity of that system of rules.”). 
 444. See id.; supra notes 180–83 and accompanying text (discussing controlling 
precedents before Shady Grove). 
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integrity of [a uniform] system of rules.”445
Only Justice Sotomayor’s opinion remains true to Burlington Northern’s 
standard.  Justice Stevens rejected any approach that would construe the 
Enabling Act as authorizing the preemption of any state laws “intertwined” 
with substantive rights.
  Thus, the opinion that decided 
Shady Grove on the narrowest grounds would involve the narrowest 
departure from Burlington Northern. 
446  Because his opinion also opens a Pandora’s box 
of unpredictable and problematic outcomes,447 he could not have decided 
the case on the narrowest grounds.  Nor could Justice Scalia’s plurality, 
which would expand Burlington Northern’s exception for incidental effects 
to permit virtually any effect on substantive rights, including the 
preemption of a state’s definition of its own rights and remedies.448  Justice 
Sotomayor’s approach, in contrast, would allow a Federal Rule to preempt a 
state law intertwined with substantive rights when it is “reasonably 
necessary”449 for the Rules’ uniformity because a narrower construction is 
impossible.450  Therefore, she “‘concurred in the judgment on the narrowest 
grounds’” and her “opinion” should serve as Shady Grove’s holding.451
C.  Resolving the Lower Courts’ Split 
 
If the lower courts had followed Justice Sotomayor’s opinion as the 
holding of Shady Grove, they would have avoided issuing conflicting 
decisions.  Under her approach, the courts should have first determined 
whether the Federal Rule can preempt the state law without regulating 
substantive rights.452  This would have required considering what the state 
law regulates to determine if they share the same subject.453  If the Federal 
Rule shares the same subject as a state law that regulates substantive rights, 
the courts should have interpreted the Rule to regulate only procedure.454  
Once the court had construed the Rule to “‘really regulat[e] procedure,’” it 
would fall within the Enabling Act’s authorization and the court could 
apply it.455
 
 445. Burlington N., 480 U.S. at 5, 8; see supra notes 
  This Section examines how application of this approach would 
resolve the lower courts’ confusion demonstrated in Part III. 
136–41 and accompanying text. 
 446. See Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1452 (Stevens, J., concurring); supra notes 243–45, 
251 and accompanying text. 
 447. See supra notes 425–41 and accompanying text. 
 448. See Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1445 n.10, 1446 n.13 (plurality opinion); supra notes 
381–82 and accompanying text. 
 449. Burlington N., 480 U.S. at 5. 
 450. See supra notes 396–98 and accompanying text. 
 451. Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977) (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 
U.S. 153, 169 n.15 (1976) (opinion of Stewart, Powell, & Stevens, JJ.)); see supra notes 
261–63. 
 452. See supra notes 410–22 and accompanying text. 
 453. See supra notes 410–20 and accompanying text. 
 454. See supra notes 419–22 and accompanying text. 
 455. See Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 130 S. Ct. 1431, 
1442 (2010) (plurality opinion) (alteration in original) (quoting Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 
312 U.S. 1, 14 (1941)). 
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Part III examined the ways in which courts are dealing with an apparent 
conflict between Federal Rule 23 and state laws that restrict the availability 
of a class remedy.  Most of these decisions skip the first step of the 
Enabling Act analysis—interpreting the Rules’ scope—which would be 
decisive in most instances.456  Each court should have employed a 
construction of Rule 23 that only regulates procedure, which the Shady 
Grove majority had already provided:  Rule 23 regulates only the criteria 
necessary for plaintiffs to join their claims in a class action, and not the 
rights or remedies available to them.457
With the exception of the TCPA cases and American Copper,
  Therefore, the lower courts only 
had to determine whether the state law addresses a different subject by 
regulating substantive rights. 
458 each 
case examined in Part III dealt with a state law that creates an individual 
right of action, but not a class right of action.459  These types of state laws 
are distinguishable from N.Y. C.P.L.R. 901(b), the procedural rule at issue 
in Shady Grove, which “[b]y its terms” addresses the same subject as Rule 
23:  whether a court could certify a class action.460  It does not define the 
scope of any particular substantive right under New York law.461
 
 456. See supra Part III.B–C. 
  The laws 
at issue in the decisions detailed in Part III, however, “really” regulate 
 457. See Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1437, 1439 & n.4 (plurality opinion); id. at 1436 
(noting that Justice Stevens joined this part of the plurality opinion); see also id. at 1443 
(plurality opinion) (deciding “Rule 23 . . . allows willing plaintiffs to join their separate 
claims against the same defendants in a class action” without “alter[ing] the rights 
themselves, [or] the available remedies”); id. at 1459–60 (Stevens, J., concurring) (deciding 
that “Rule 23 governs class certification” and rejecting the argument that it “enlarge[s] New 
York’s ‘limited’ damages remedy” (quoting dissent)). 
 458. The TCPA cases involved the proper interpretation of the TCPA’s “otherwise 
permitted” language. See supra notes 290–300, 304–06 and accompanying text.  The 
resolution of this issue is beyond the scope of this Note.  If the Second Circuit’s 
interpretation in Holster is correct and the TCPA incorporates any state law or court rule that 
would prevent class recovery, then TCPA claims should be analyzed like the other cases in 
which the substantive law creating the right denies a class remedy. See infra notes 459–71 
and accompanying text.  American Copper, on the other hand, was distinct in that it analyzed 
the conflict between Federal Rule 23 and a state procedural rule that is identical to N.Y. 
C.P.L.R. 901(b). See supra notes 312–13 and accompanying text.  Because the Shady Grove 
majority held that N.Y. C.P.L.R. 901(b) only regulates procedure, the American Copper 
court was probably correct to conclude that Rule 23 conflicts with and preempts an identical 
state procedural rule. Cf. supra notes 203, 218–19, 233–36, 257–60 and accompanying text 
(discussing Shady Grove’s treatment of N.Y. C.P.L.R. 901(b)). 
 459. See Walker v. Sunrise Pontiac-GMC Truck, Inc., 249 S.W.3d 301, 309–10 (Tenn. 
2008) (holding that the state statute only allows individuals to bring actions, including “a 
next friend or executor, [who] brings an action on behalf of another individual,” but prohibits 
class actions “because they are not actions brought ‘individually’” (quoting Tennessee 
Consumer Protection Act, TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-18-109(a)(1) (2001))); Marrone v. Phillip 
Morris USA, Inc., 850 N.E.2d 31, 33 (Ohio 2006) (holding that a plaintiff may recover 
certain damages individually under Section 1345.09(A) of the OCSPA, but may recover 
“other appropriate relief in a class action” only “if the defendant’s alleged violation of the 
Act is substantially similar to an act or practice previously declared to be deceptive by one of 
the methods identified in [section] 1345.09(B)” (citing OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1345.09 
(LexisNexis 2006))); supra notes 320–21, 329, 339–40, 347–48, 357 and accompanying text. 
 460. Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1437 (plurality opinion). 
 461. See id. at 1443; id. at 1457 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
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whether or not a class right of action exists.462  If Rule 23 preempts these 
state laws, then it too would regulate substantive rights.463  For this reason, 
most of the courts decided that Rule 23 exceeds the Enabling Act’s 
authorization,464 while a few decided to apply the Rule regardless of its 
effect on substantive rights.465  Under Justice Sotomayor’s test, both sets of 
courts should have determined that Rule 23 does not conflict with these 
state laws and avoided a construction that violates the Enabling Act.466
Avoiding this violation is straightforward because Shady Grove already 
provided a valid construction of Federal Rule 23.  Rule 23 merely sets forth 
the criteria a plaintiff must meet if he wants to join his claims in a class 
action.
 
467  If a plaintiff meets Rule 23’s requirements, the federal court 
must certify his proposed class and join the claims because it is within the 
plaintiff’s discretion whether to maintain his claim as a class action, not the 
court’s.468
Yet Rule 23 does not purport to authorize federal courts to grant the 
plaintiffs’ requested relief.  As construed in Shady Grove, Rule 23 is merely 
a rule of joinder—a procedural rule related to proper pleading, but unrelated 
to adjudicating substantive rights or liabilities.
 
469  To recover his damages, 
a plaintiff must state a claim upon which relief may be granted.470
 
 462. See Walker, 249 S.W.3d at 310 (deciding that “‘[t]he Act limits private actions to 
individual claims’ and, ‘[a]ccordingly, class actions cannot be maintained’” (alterations in 
original) (quoting Tucker v. Sierra Builders, 180 S.W.3d 109, 115 n.9 (Tenn. Ct. App. 
2005))). 
  In 
diversity actions, state law provides the grounds on which the court may 
 463. Cf. supra notes 410–13, 419–20 and accompanying text (arguing that Justice 
Sotomayor’s approach would consider whether the state law regulates substantive rights). 
 464. See generally supra Part III.C. 
 465. See supra notes 304–06, 322–25 and accompanying text. 
 466. See supra notes 413, 420–22 and accompanying text. 
 467. See supra note 457 and accompanying text. 
 468. See Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 130 S. Ct. 1431, 
1438 (2010) (plurality opinion) (“Courts do not maintain actions; litigants do.”).  Justice 
Stevens joined this part of the plurality opinion. See id. at 1448 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
 469. See id. at 1443 (plurality opinion) (“A class action, no less than traditional joinder 
(of which it is a species), merely enables a federal court to adjudicate claims of multiple 
parties at once, instead of in separate suits.  And like traditional joinder, it leaves the parties’ 
legal rights and duties intact and the rules of decision unchanged.”); cf. FED. R. CIV. P. 18 
advisory committee’s note (1966 Amendment) (“It is emphasized that amended Rule 18(a) 
[regarding permissive joinder of claims] deals only with pleading.”); Leimer v. Woods, 196 
F.2d 828, 833 (8th Cir. 1952) (holding that joinder under Rule 18(a) “simply affords a 
vehicle for convenience, facilitation and economy in litigation procedurally, and it does not 
have as its object to put it within the power of one party or the court thereby to produce a 
substantive impingement upon any right or liability”); 7 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 33, 
§ 1652 at 398 & n.8 (3d ed. 2001 & Supp. 2011) (noting that permissive party joinder under 
Rule 20(a) “does not alter the substantive rights of the parties”). 
 470. See FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2); Bower v. IBM, Inc., 495 F. Supp. 2d 837, 840–41 (S.D. 
Ohio 2007) (considering only whether the “class claim made by the Plaintiffs should be 
dismissed because they have failed to allege a material element of such a cause of action”); 
cf. Marrone v. Phillip Morris USA, Inc., 850 N.E.2d 31, 34 (Ohio 2006) (noting that “[i]n 
order to maintain a class action, plaintiffs must meet the prerequisites set forth in Civ.R. 23 
[Ohio’s class action rule],” but that the issue before the court was whether the plaintiff pled a 
claim under the substantive statute, not whether the plaintiff complied with that procedural 
rule). 
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grant relief, but in these types of cases, the state statutes do not provide for 
class recovery.471  Thus, federal courts have no authority to grant the 
requested relief and such a complaint should be dismissed for failure to 
state a claim.472
If the lower courts apply this test, they would avoid reaching conflicting 
results.  Courts that would have followed Justice Scalia’s plurality would 
avoid applying Rule 23 in a way that creates a right to relief that does not 
exist, in violation of the Enabling Act.
 
473  Those courts that would have 
followed Justice Stevens would avoid the problematic conclusion that Rule 
23 is “ultra vires.”474
CONCLUSION 
  This simple resolution further illustrates that Justice 
Sotomayor’s opinion decided Shady Grove on the narrowest grounds and 
eliminated Erie’s confusing influence. 
After nearly a century of futility, the Supreme Court in Shady Grove 
should have finally defeated Erie’s influence and developed an independent 
Federal Rules analysis.  Instead, the Court split into competing opinions 
that are creating confusion among the lower courts and allowing Erie to 
transform and escape.  In its new form, Erie is convincing courts to 
invalidate Federal Rules that would preempt state laws “intertwined” with 
substantive rights.  Justice Sotomayor’s hidden “opinion,” however, would 
prevent this result.  Because it decided the case on the narrowest grounds 
and because it promotes the Federal Rules’ uniformity and integrity, her 
“opinion” should serve as Shady Grove’s holding. 
 
 
 471. See supra note 459 and accompanying text. 
 472. See FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6); McKinney v. Bayer Corp., 744 F. Supp. 2d 733, 742 
(N.D. Ohio 2010) (“[D]ismissal pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) is proper as to the OCSPA class 
claim . . . .”); Bower, 495 F. Supp. 2d at 841 (holding that “pursuit of this claim as a class 
action is improper” because the complaint’s allegations did not satisfy the statute’s 
requirements and therefore dismissing “the Plaintiffs’ claims brought on behalf of the 
proposed class”); see also FED. R. CIV. P. 12(f) (providing motion to strike parts of a 
pleading); Bearden v. Honeywell Int’l Inc., No. 3:09-1035, 2010 WL 3239285, at *10 (M.D. 
Tenn. Aug. 16, 2010) (deciding to “strike the class allegations” because the state statute 
limits recovery to individual claims). 
 473. See supra notes 304–06, 320–25 and accompanying text. 
 474. See supra notes 333–35, 351 and accompanying text. 
